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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates a Chilean urban agriculture project that has been
underway for more than twenty years in Tom6, a small coastal town located near
the regional capital of Concepci6n. Initiated in the early 1980s by the Chilean
non-governmental organization, CET SUR, the program works on themes of food
security and poverty alleviation, environmental issues and women's leadership
development. In 1999, this project began to replicate the Tome experience to
seven additional towns in and around the Greater Concepci6n area with a new
initiative entitled the Toward Sustainable Cities Project.
Similar urban agriculture programs began at the same time in Santiago, but only
remnants of those projects remain: a program for seniors here, a demonstration
garden at the environment center there. The project in Tom6, instead of shrinking
as economic conditions improved from the crisis of the early 1980s, has recently
spread to seven additional towns. This puzzle forms the crux of my research:
what are some of the factors that may explain why this project has achieved this
longevity and managed to grow its program, while similar programs in Chile have
long since vanished?
The investigation identifies two sets of factors that distinguish the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project from other urban agriculture programs. The first is the
high level of dedication to the job of its frontline workers. CET SUR motivates
these workers in several ways: offering them opportunities to develop their
personal skills, as well as granting them substantial discretion in decisionmaking.
The second factor that contributes to the project's relative success is the myriad
networks CET SUR has developed with government. CET SUR has developed
these networks by linking program objectives with political realities such as the
need of local elected officials to deliver concrete and/or visible benefits to
constituents and maintain a high public profile.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
This research grew out of an interesting incongruity: urban agriculture. At first,
those two words may appear to be a contradiction in terms. In fact, most of our
notions about what it means to be urban is a negation of what it means to be
rural-high-rise apartment buildings versus secluded homes, dense land uses
versus dispersed ones, the hustle and bustle of the city versus the tranquil
solitude of nature. Agriculture is an activity that we tend to associate with rural
areas. In fact, to some, an urban area is precisely defined as a place where
agriculture does not exist.
Furthermore, there seem to be many reasons why agriculture should not exist in
the city: for instance, the opportunity costs of land or the risk of polluting crops
with contaminated air, water and soil. From an economic perspective, decreasing
returns to scale of small, fragmented food production suggest that urban areas
may never be anything more than an insignificant and occasional location for
food production.
Yet researchers have documented cases of urban agriculture that exceed the
scale of mere hobby gardening. Havana is the most widely known example:
urban farms there produced 8,500 tons of produce in 1996.1 Also significant is
the lesser-known experience of Dar es Salaam. There, urban agriculture is the
largest employer in the city, and 90 percent of the leafy vegetables consumed by
urban residents are actually grown in urbanized areas.2 In Shanghai,
researchers have estimated that 60 percent of vegetables, more than half of pork
1 Altieri, Miguel, et al (December 1998). "The greening of the 'barrios': Urban agriculture for food
security in Cuba". Agriculture and Human Values.
2 "Urban Agriculture's Contribution to Sustainable Urbanisation." (2000). The Resource Center on Urban
Agriculture and Forestry (RUAF).
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and poultry and more than 90 percent of milk and eggs originate from urban and
peri-urban areas.3
In Chile, the most widely known example of urban
agriculture is in Tome, a coastal port town of over
50,000 people located near the regional capital of
Concepci6n and 340 miles south of Santiago (Figure OWWA.
1-1). Tom6 is home to Chile's longest running
experiment with urban agriculture. In this small town,
the nongovernmental organization (NGO) CET SUR 4  *
has trained 5,000 people (16% of the adult
population)5 in the methods of agroecology6 over the
past twenty years. This training was a response to the
ATLANTIC
r*C FANpressing food security needs of Tome residents hit
hard by the economic crisis of the early 1980s.
Similar urban agriculture programs began at the same Figure 1-1: Location of the
time in Santiago, but only remnants of those projects Greater Concepcion Area
remain: a program for seniors here, a demonstration garden at the environment
center there. The project in Tome', instead of shrinking as economic conditions
improved, has grown larger. The urban agriculture program has recently spread
to seven additional towns in and around the Greater Concepcion area with a new
initiative entitled the Toward Sustainable Cities Project.
3 Yi-Zhang and Zhangen (2000). Shanghai: Trends towards Specialised and Capital-Intensive Urban
Agriculture. . In: Bakker Nico, Marielle Dubbeling, Sabine Guendel, Ulrich Sabel-Koschella and Henk de
Zeeuw. Growing, Cities. Growing Food: Urban Agriculture on the Policy Agenda: A Reader on Urban
Agriculture. pp. 43-66.
4 CET SUR stands for Center for Education and Technology for the Development of the South (Centro de
Educaci6n y Tecnologia para el Desarrollo del Sur).
5 MIDEPLAN. Based on the 1992 population over 20 years of age. Available at www.infopais mideplan.cl
6 Agroecology is a science led by Prof. Miguel Altieri at UC Berkeley among others that demonstrates the
ecologic systems involved in agricultural food production. Implicit in agroecological research is the idea
that, by understanding ecological relationships and processes, agroecosystemns can be manipulated to
improve production and to produce more sustainably, with fewer negative environmental or social impacts
and fewer external inputs (Altieri 1995).
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This puzzle over the relative success of the program in Tome forms the crux of
my research: what are some of the factors that may explain why this project has
achieved this longevity and recent expansion while similar programs in Chile
have long since vanished?
1.1 WHY RESEARCH URBAN AGRICTULTURE?
Urban agriculture is a phenomenon with global reach. A 1996 study by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) 7 found that 15 percent of produce
consumed in cities around the globe is actually grown in urbanized areas. The
study also estimates that 800 million people worldwide practice urban agriculture,
of whom one quarter (200 million) generate household income from the sale of
their produce. Manifestations of urban agriculture include everything from small
household gardens to medium scale production along power lines or at airports.
My introduction to urban agriculture was through the lens of the United States
experience. The history of urban agriculture in the US extends from the
nineteenth century allotment gardens, which achieved their largest scale in
Buffalo and Detroit (feeding 1,000-2,000 households during the country's first
economic depression), to the famous Victory Gardens of World War I to the
existing Community Gardens that dot cities from San Francisco to Chicago to
Boston.8 As I became more involved and knowledgeable about Community
Gardening-particularly through an internship at the Boston Natural Areas
Network that afforded me the opportunity to work directly with Boston's
Community Gardeners-I learned how the history of these Community Gardens
is often a response to the US experience of urban abandonment of the 1960s
and 70s and a community development and mobilization strategy to take back
trash-filled lots and crime-ridden streets became apparent.
7 Smit, J. (1996). Urban Agriculture: Food, Jobs and Sustainable Cities. United Nations Development
Programme. Publication Series for Habitat II. Volume One.
8 Warner, Sam Bass. (1987). To Dwell is to Garden. Northeastern University Press.
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However, the literature on urban agriculture9 presents a different story of urban
agriculture in the developing world. In contrast to the community development
orientation of the Community Gardens in the United States, urban agriculture in
the developing world is characterized more as a survival strategy for the poor.
The seminal work on this topic is the aforementioned 1996 UNDP study, which
catalogues the experiences of urban agriculture from Santiago to Calcutta, from
Tanzania to Beirut. The case-based research on this topic also illustrates the way
urban agriculture is frequently a response to crisis, such as rapid urbanization or
macroeconomic adjustment. The dissertation work of Bishwapriya Sanyal'0
details the actors involved in urban agriculture as well as their motivations for
gardening in Lusaka, Zambia in the early 1980s and is the earliest study
documenting urban agriculture as a response to economic crisis. In this research,
Sanyal found that 60 percent of low-income households were growing food in the
city as a response to the declining real earnings of these families.
9 See, for instance:
The Research Center on Urban Agriculture's (RUAF) website: www.ruaf.org. They publish a quarterly
magazine on urban agriculture.
City Farmer website of the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRP) website:
www.cityfarmer.org
Urban and Peri-urban Agriculture website of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN:
http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/COAG/COAG15/X0076e.htm
Agroecologia y Desarrollo. Volume Number 11/12. November 1997. The Latin American Consortium
publishes this journal for Agroecology and Development (CLADES). This whole issue is on the topic of
urban agriculture.
Baumgartner, Bettina and Hasan Belevi (September 2001). "A Systematic Overview of Urban Agriculture
in Developing Countries." EAWAG, the Swiss Federal Institute for Environmental Science and
Technology and SANDEC, the Department of Water and Sanitation in Developing Countries.
Bakker Nico, Marielle Dubbeling, Sabine Guendel, Ulrich Sabel-Koschella and Henk de Zeeuw (1999).
Growing Cities, Growing Food: Urban Agriculture on the Policy Agenda: A Reader on Urban Agriculture.
Petra Jacobi, Axel W. Drescher and Jorg Amend (May 2000). "Urban Agriculture-Justification and
Planning Guidelines," Urban Vegetable Promotion Project Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives
(MAC), Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
Smit, J. (1996). Urban Agriculture: Food, Jobs and Sustainable Cities. United Nations Development
Programme. Publication Series for Habitat II. Volume One.
10 Sanyal, Bishwapriya (1984). Urban Agriculture: a strategy of survival in Zambia. University of
California Los Angeles.
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Research also attests to urban agriculture's
potential to promote local sustainable
development in less developed countries," as
farming in the city, if properly managed, can
incorporate the three E's of sustainability:
environmental sustainability, economic
sustainability and equitable (or social)
sustainability. Figure 1-2 illustrates the way this
literature promotes urban agriculture as a way to
achieve these three objectives simultaneously.
Figure 1-3: Inside the
Compost Plant in Tome
Urban Agriculture asa Tool for Local Sustainablity
Figure 1-2
Urban agriculture can have an important impact on
the environment through sustainable management
of open space, recycling of organic materials to
make compost (Figure 1.3) while enriching
degraded urban soils, and providing a means to
manage wastewater through appropriate
technologies and its subsequent use in
irrigation.1213 An example of the latter is in arid
Cochabamba, Bolivia, where the IDRC (International
Development Research Center of Canada) and a
local NGO, CREAMOS, have developed a pilot
" See, in particular:
Deelstra, Tjeerd and Herbert Girardet (1999) "Urban Agriculture and Sustainable Cities" Thematic Paper 2
in Growing Cities, Growing Food: Urban Agriculture on the Policy Agenda: A Reader on Urban
Agriculture. pp. 43-66.
"Urban Agriculture's Contribution to Sustainable Urbanization" (2000). RUAF publication.
12 Strauss, Martin (August 2000). "Human Waste (Excreta and Wastewater) Reuse. EAWAG/SANDEC,
Water & Sanitation in Developing Countries.
13 Ricaldi, Victor (1997). "Reuso de Aguas Servidas en Agriculture, Cochabamba, Bolivia" in Agricultura
Urbana en America Latina y el Caribe. IDRC.
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project to reuse urban wastewater for crops. 14 Another example is Santiago,
Chile in which the vast majority of urban wastewater is used for irrigation.15
The economic impact of urban agriculture varies. Because the extreme poor
spend as much as 60 to 80 percent of their income on food,16'17 they practice
urban agriculture at the subsistence level in an effort to enhance food security
while increasing disposable income through savings on food expenditures. For
others, urban agriculture is a gateway into
local markets through the sale of excess
produce (including medicinal and
ornamental plants or native tree species) or
the initiation of small enterprises. These
enterprises range from the production of
necessary inputs for urban agriculture-
Figure 1-4: Conserves Produced for Sale by such as seeds, compost, organicUrban Growers in Tome
pesticides, and water delivery-to food
processing enterprises that vary from jam or salsa production (Figure 1-4) to the
sale of homegrown and hand-rolled cigars to opening a restaurant or catering
service.18
Urban agriculture can also have significant social impacts by reducing local crime
and trash through the recuperation of urban spaces, by enabling leadership
development, particularly for women, and by providing important psychological
benefits. For seniors, the need for the latter may be particularly acute. Several
growers in Santiago who were part of a senior's gardening program, attested to
14 Ibid. (Ricaldi).
15 Ibid. (Strauss). The author actually claims that this number is 100 percent.
16 Tabatabai, H. (1993) "Poverty and food consumption in urban Zaire." Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy
Porgram Working Paper 46. Ithaca: Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program.
17 Maxwell, D., Larbi, Lamptey, ,Zakariah and Armar-Klemesu (1998). "Farming in the shadow of the city:
changes in land rights and livelihoods in peri-urban Accra. In Urban agriculture in the Greater Accra
Metropolitan Area. Report to IDRC.
18 Homer, Robert J. (December 2001). "Appropriate Methods for Micro-enterprise Development in Urban
Agriculture." Urban Agriculture Magazine. RUAF publication.
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the need just to get out of the house everyday and do something productive and
social. One woman said that when she's in her house all her problems mount up,
but when she goes out to the garden, she feels much more tranquilo.19
In these ways, urban agriculture often explicitly attempts to address issues of
public health-by seeking to heighten food security for urban residents,
encourage physical activity and increase associationalism. In Chile, for example,
a national public health initiative, Vida Chile, has funded several urban
agriculture programs as a way to promote these multiple preventive health
objectives in one fell swoop.
A word of caution, however, must accompany these claims of the virtuous nature
of urban agriculture to promote public health. Urban land is frequently
contaminated with heavy metals, most notably lead, and other toxins. Urban air
and water may also be contaminated. To the extent that urban crops take up
these pollutants, food grown in the city may expose consumers to significant
health risks.
The use of organic wastes as crop fertilizer can also compromise food safety.
When processed properly, organic fertilizers derived from wastewater and
sewage can be an invaluable input to increase soil quality and can provide a
source for irrigation in arid regions such as in Cochabamba or Santiago.
However, when not treated or treated inadequately, this organic waste can be a
transmission vector for disease. Chile has learned this lesson first-hand through
a cholera outbreak in 1991, traced to the application of untreated organic wastes
onto crops that left 144 dead in Chile and Peru. Public officials seeking to halt the
epidemic shut down many small-scale urban food production sites and brought
the epidemic quickly to a halt. Wastewater treatment is now highly regulated in
Chile as well as standards for crop irrigation.20
19 Personal communication with senior's group in El Bosque. January 2003.
20 Salinas H. (1992) "Planificaci6n Estrat6gica en el Control de la Epidemia de C61era." Eschuela de Salud
P6blica, Faculdad de Medicina, Universidad de Chile. Available at:
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1.2 CET SUR AND THE TOWARD SUSTAINABLE CITIES PROJECT
What is evident from the many cases of urban agriculture in the literature is the
malleability of this and that local actors-governments, NGOs and residents-
develop their own version of urban agriculture that is specifically tailored to their
needs. CET SUR's twenty-year experiment with urban agriculture incorporates
many of the characteristics listed in the section above but the variety of urban
agriculture that they promote in Tome is unique. This section describes CET
SUR's work in detail.
CET SUR Organizational Details
CET SUR stands for Center for Education and Technology for the Development
of the South (Centro de Educaci6n y Tecnologia para el Desarrollo el Sur). The
project was actually initiated when CET SUR was simply CET, which was
founded in 1980 in Santiago. CET SUR broke off from CET in 2001 due to
ideological differences, which mainly center around a conflict over whether to
focus solely on technical assistance or whether to include community organizing
as a fundamental element of their work. "[CET is] focused exclusively on the
technical aspects of organic farming. CET SUR broadens this approach out into
a social and political approach," as CET SUR director, Rita Moya explained.
CET continues to offer technical assistance on agroecology in Santiago and in
Yumbel, a town located near Tom6 in the 8th Region of the country. CET SUR,
on the other hand, has adopted an approach that closely integrates community
organizing with technical assistance and works in the 8th and 9 th Regions of
Chile. For the sake of clarity, I will consistently refer to the NGO as CET SUR
even when referring to events that occurred prior to 2001.
www.cepis.ops-oms.org/bvsaar/E/proyecto/generales/casos/santiago.html
21 Personal communication. July 4, 2003.
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Goals
Broadly speaking CET SUR's work tackles issues of food security and poverty
alleviation as well as themes of environmental quality and women's leadership
development. A major goal of the program centers on the question of food
security for the poor. The program aims to "make family agriculture viable,
transforming it in a productive base of local and sustainable food security, for the
beneficiaries of the program as well as other consumers in the participating
towns." The program also focuses on "improving the food supply, both
quantitatively and qualitatively as well as strengthening the local economy."22 A
new goal revolves around strengthening civil society and participation "to think
and dream together with civil society, about how to live without exclusion or
discrimination with social justice, reconnecting with ourselves and with real
participation of the citizenry through strengthening leadership and
associationalism."23
Staff
CET SUR maintains two offices, the central office in Penco, a 15-minute bus ride
from Tom6 and an additional office in Temuco, the capital of the 9 th Region of
Chile. Six fulltime staff operate out of this office in Penco and an additional four
operate out of the office in Temuco.
Funding Sources & Networks with Government
The largest contributions to CET SUR's budget come from international sources
including Pan para El Mundo, a German foundation, which gave $756,600 over
five years to the Toward Sustainable Cities Project. The America's Fund also
22 From CET SUR's website: www.cetsur.cl.
23 CET SUR internal report (December 2002). "Informe Narativo: Transici6n Hacia un Modelo de Ciudad
Sustentable: Desarrollo Local, Articulaci6n Institucional y Sustentabilidad en Regi6n de Bio Bio." This
report is a self-evaluation of their work from July 2002 to December 2002.
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contributed $72,100 to the program over three years. The Belgium government
has contributed to the compost plant in Tome. Other Chilean sources of funding
are the National Fund for Regional Development24 and the NGO Trabajo para un
Hermano, both of which have contributed to the compost plant in Tome.
CET SUR's ability to form networks with government provides another significant
source of funding. CET SUR has connections with health, environmental, and
educational departments at the local and regional level. It also has worked with
local community development and even sanitation departments. Furthermore,
CET SUR has worked with the Chilean social fund FOSIS and SERCOTEC, (The
Service for Technical Cooperation).25 The Toward Sustainable Cities Project has
also found an ally in the national health initiative Vida Chile. CET SUR's ability to
raise funds is closely related to their networking capability. For instance, as a
partnership of several years with Vida Chile comes to an end, CET SUR's
contacts in government are enabling the NGO to seek out other sources of
funding.
The Program
CET SUR's work responds to the physical reality of the dense urban form in
Tom6. Food production is small in scale and designed for the patios of private
homes. The NGO teaches growers how to produce vegetables and raise
livestock, all in the limited space of a normal home's patio (around 65 ft2, on
average). CET SUR offers three levels of courses to teach participants about
intensive agricultural techniques, such as developing raised beds for plants,
composting organic kitchen and yard scraps, raising chickens and rabbits as well
as constructing greenhouses and mud ovens. All of these lessons are based on
the basic principles of agroecology. For instance, growers do not use synthetic
fertilizers or pesticides, but rather produce their own fertilizer by the
24 Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional. It's the principal way by which the central government transfers
financial resources for regional project that are related to social or economic infrastructure.
25 El Servicio de Cooperaci6n T6cnica
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biodegradation of organic waste into nutrient-rich compost and use integrated
pest management strategies, which harness the natural properties of plants, to
discourage infestations. Production and sale of food is focused on local networks
as a strategy to promote local food security. CET SUR also seeks to preserve
and develop local knowledge about indigenous crop varieties, propagating native
and heirloom food species and preserving and exchanging seeds. In this aspect
of CET SUR's work, in particular, the NGO seeks to advocate for and protect the
traditions of the Mapuche people, the largest indigenous group in Chile.
The project began with the mission to promote urban agriculture as a response
severe urban poverty. However, in its twenty-year history, the project has
evolved beyond a strict focus on urban agriculture, involving thousands of
residents in programs that range from gardener training to municipal composting
plants and from micro-enterprise formation to eco-clubs for youth. CET SUR's
twenty-year history of working in Tom6 on urban agriculture has formed a wealth
of knowledge and experience that beneficiaries, staff, funders and government
officials thought valuable enough to replicate in other towns. This expansion was
launched with the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, initiated by CET SUR in
1999, to replicate the project to seven nearby municipalities that surround and/or
comprise the Greater Metropolitan Area of Concepci6n. These towns are
Hualqui, Coelemu, Quirihue, Ranquil, Bulnes, Quill6n and San Nicolds (Figure 1-
5).
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Figure 1-5: Participating Towns in the Toward Sustainable Cities Project
Table 1-1: Population Statistics on the Participating Towns
Tome 49,284 52,440 6.4% 87.6%
Hualqui 16,156 18,768 16.2% 78.6%
Quirihue 10,971 11,429 4.2% 69.6%
Coelemu 16,630 16,082 -3.3% 61.2%
Bulnes 19,713 20,595 4.5% 60.8%
Quill6n 14,562 15,146 4.0% 49.8%
Ranquil 6,404 5,683 -11.3% 23.5%
San Nicolas 9,495 9,741 2.6% 35.2%
Agroecology Groups
The NGO forms the program beneficiaries into groups of 10-15 people for the
coursework. Typically, the groups that form in the first year remain stable
throughout the course of the entire program, although the groups do tend to
shrink as the years go by. One staff member estimated that the groups shrink 25
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percent from the first year to the second. From the second year on, the groups
are usually established.26
Each level of the coursework lasts a year and classes are held once a week
typically for three hours. Level One (the first year) focuses on how to build raised
beds, how to compost and the construction of mud ovens. In Level Two,
beneficiaries learn how to build greenhouses as well as chicken and rabbit
rearing. The third and last level is optional and teaches skills that could be used
to form microenterprises such as growing worms for composting, producing
animal feed or making preserves.
Agroecology Nuclei
Once the groups have completed the coursework, they are free to continue to
operate as a group. In each city, CET SUR staff and the monitoras are working to
form citywide associations of the agroecology groups. These associations are
referred to as agroecology nuclei. CET SUR encourages the agroecology groups
to apply legal status and become integrated into one of the town-wide
associations, such as the Union of Organic Growers (UCHO) 27 in Tome, the
largest and most established of these agroecology nuclei. The UCHO is
comprised up of nineteen groups that have matriculated through the CET SUR
coursework since 1993. This group meets weekly to discuss large-community
projects related to urban agriculture. In
2000, the UCHO provided training to all
members in growing and selling medicinal
plants. That year, the UCHO also
constructed its headquarters (Figure 1-6), a
small building with space for meetings, a
mud oven, greenhouses as well as Figure 1-6: Entering the UCHO
Community Garden plots for households Headquarters in Tome.
26 Personal communication with Marco Rojas, CET SUR field technician.
27 Uni6n Comunal de Huertos Orginicos.
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who do not have space in their homes for a garden. The current project involves
turning over ownership of the municipal compost plant to the UCHO to run as an
enterprise.
The objective of nurturing agroecology nuclei like the UCHO in every
participating town in the project is to ultimately develop a region-wide union that
would be able to leverage greater resources for this type of project and wield
political power.
Monitoras
CET SUR employs frontline workers to teach the classes, recruit new members
to the program, and manage the local program budgets. For the sake of
expediency, I will refer to CET SUR staff from the central office in Penco simply
as "CET SUR staff" and refer to the frontline workers based in each town as
"monitoras."The monitoras are a class of their own in the actors of the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project. Not quite CET SUR staff, they are also not simple
beneficiaries of the program. All the monitoras are female and that is why I refer
to them in the feminine conjugation of the noun (i.e. monitora instead of the more
typical monitor, which would refer to both men and women).
The 20 active monitoras employed by CET SUR typically live in the towns in
which they teach, having themselves matriculated through a minimum of two
years of the coursework. The monitoras receive a salary of around 5,500 pesos
($7.84)28 per class, which typically last three hours and require additional work
beforehand and afterwards. Some monitoras teach up to four classes a week.
Still, even an active monitora teaching four classes (or 12 hours a week not
including the necessary prep work, which might bring the total up to around 20
hours per week) would only receive a monthly wage of around 80,000 pesos
28 Calculated with the July 28, 2003 exchange rate of 701.61 pesos to the dollar reported at
www.latercera.cl.
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($114), which is well below the minimum wage of 111,200 pesos.29 It is
misleading however, to compare the monitoras'salaries to the minimum wage as
that would be comparing part-time to full-time work. Considering that this work
encompasses fewer hours than a full-time job (by about half), being a monitora
may present comparative advantages, especially for women who do not wish,
cannot, or are not allowed by their husbands to work full-time.
However, CET SUR staff stress that they de-emphasize the pay, highlighting
instead other advantages to becoming a monitora, such as giving back,
promoting biodiversity or grounding their work in the larger picture of a struggle to
save local knowledge in a globalizing world. Still, the NGO has cleverly linked the
monitoras'personal financial incentives with the program's expansion goals.
Because the monitoras are paid based on the number of classes they teach, they
generate their own business, so to speak, by recruiting new participants and
forming them into groups.
The selection of monitoras is an involved process. Candidates must complete
two years of the minimum coursework as a regular beneficiary of the program.
From there, the process of initial selection involves beneficiaries, CET SUR and
the other monitoras. The monitoras must fulfill three criteria: demonstrated
technical skills, demonstrated teaching abilities and a willingness to give back to
the community. Efforts are made to ensure that monitoras do not just take on the
work for money but are motivated by civic-mindedness.30 Once a beneficiary has
demonstrated an interest in becoming a monitora, and CET SUR staff, other
monitoras, and beneficiaries have approved her, she must complete another year
of unpaid training, which involves three-day weekend retreats every month.
Although all expenses are paid for this training, for many women, leaving their
homes for that much time every month is not an easy task. They might have
children to care for, or a husband who does not approve of their wife taking off for
29 "Gobierno sube salario minimo poco mis de lo anunciado." (July 28, 2003). La Tercera. The minimum
wage equals $159/mo or $1902/yr.
30 Interview with Rita Moya, CET SUR Director. July 4, 2003.
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days at time to go to courses on leadership. The retreats are typically in
Concepci6n or ChillAn, which presents other hurdles-it takes many of these
women several hours to travel from their homes to these larger cities.
What CET SUR Provides
The material resources that CET SUR provides vary from town to town based on
the resources that the NGO is able to leverage from the municipality itself. CET
SUR strives to secure municipal funding to cover the material costs of program.
However, they almost always pay for the salaries of monitoras, unless an
agreement is made for local agencies to pay for them. CET SUR also capitalizes
the revolving loan funds (FIT)31 that some towns have started and provides
technical support. They also pay room and board at conferences and workshops,
training sessions for monitoras and activities, and travel expenses to local,
national and even international events.
Why Research CET SUR's Toward Sustainable Cities Project?
CET SUR and the Toward Sustainable Cities Project jumped out as a project ripe
for investigation for several reasons. First of all, the relatively high profile of this
project in Chile suggests that CET SUR is somehow doing things differently as
compared with the dismal results of similar urban agriculture projects in Santiago.
I was in Chile in January of 2003, conducting preliminary field research for this
thesis and several people who worked on urban agriculture in Santiago, a city six
hours away by bus, knew of the work going on in Toms, including an NGO leader
and a community health worker. They cited CET SUR's work as an urban
agriculture "success story." In fact, it was because of this project's relative
success in Chile, that I abandoned plans to research urban agriculture in
Santiago and made the decision to focus solely on CET SUR's work.
Secondly, interviews with beneficiaries and frontline staff indicate the disparate
ways program has had an important impact on program beneficiaries' lives. The
31 Fondo de Inovaci6n Tecnol6gico.
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project's overt commitment to work with women and the historically
disenfranchised Mapuche people is striking. Several people spoke of the
transformative power of the project, particularly in the way that it has nurtured
women's leadership, and several women spoke of how they still have to ask their
husband's permission to leave the house but that this program affords them a
valuable social outlet. With its focus on preserving local knowledge of food
production, particularly through the seed exchanges, the project raises
awareness of the Mapuche culture. Furthermore, almost every beneficiary with
whom I spoke mentioned the importance of this project in improving their diet (an
urgent task in Chile in which heart disease and cancer, not undernourishment or
communicable disease, are the major threats to public health), promoting social
activities, getting them out of their houses, and fighting depression. Also, for
many beneficiaries, their garden had become a significant source of household
income, which enabled them to provide for their families when their partners
could not find work or simply allowed them to have the experience of earning
their own income.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
After a preliminary site visit in January of 2003, I spent the month of June 2003
conducting interviews with urban growers (beneficiaries of the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project), government officials, and CET SUR staff in all eight
towns in which the program is operating. I spent most of my time in the field
interviewing individuals associated with the program and observing meetings. In
total, I conducted twenty-seven interviews with government officials in municipal,
provincial and regional offices and accompanied CET SUR staff to two meetings
with local government officials. I also spoke with several school directors, a social
worker at a hospital and the director of another non-profit involved in the
composting program in Tome.
32Diplomado en Promoci6n de Salud (2002). Instituto de Nutrici6n y Tecnologia de los Alimentos.
University of Chile.
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Sometimes the most valuable information, however, does not come across in
formal interviews. I found that more informal events, such as two seed-exchange
events (referred to as Trafkintu in the Mapuche language), enabled me to talk
casually with participants who freely shared their reflections on the project. I
observed eight meetings of individual agroecology groups, or coalitions of them,
such as the UCHO in Tome. I also had the opportunity to observe the final day of
a three-day leadership workshop for participants in the program and a seminar
on citizen participation that was co-sponsored by CET SUR and open to the
public. At these events and meetings, I had the opportunity to talk with eight
monitoras as well as sixteen program beneficiaries.
1.4 CAVEAT: What This Research Does Not Undertake
This thesis does not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of CET SUR's urban
agriculture programs. A full evaluation of effectiveness is beyond the scope of
this research. The hard numbers that I have received are from CET SUR internal
reports-which are undoubtedly biased in favor of the program. Occasionally, I
use these numbers-but for illustrative purposes only, such as to give a sense of
the number of people the program has reached or the productivity of the
beneficiaries' gardens. Some of these numbers are based on surveys conducted
by CET SUR itself or by outside consultants highly sympathetic to its mission.
Sampling biases and unknown methods of sample selection, including small
sample sizes, further complicate many of these surveys. These statistical
problems could easily result in surveying the most active-and therefore most
successful-beneficiaries. This type of bias would therefore skew the survey
results toward a more complementary interpretation of the project's
effectiveness.
For these reasons, I steer my analysis away from questions of the absolute
effectiveness of the program toward an analysis of factors that have led to the
relatively successful accomplishments of the project.
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1.5 SELECTION OF FACTORS
The factors I have chosen to explore in this research to explain the relative
success of CET SUR's urban agriculture work I selected on the basis of three
criteria. First of all, I wanted to address factors that are perhaps often missed by
planners. In certain instances, these factors-because they are somewhat
contrary to conventional wisdom or popular thinking-seemed to be overlooked
even by CET SUR staff themselves. Secondly, I wanted to limit my analysis to
factors that realistically could be replicated in similar projects in other places. I
wanted to avoid factors that seemed to be circumstantial or unrepeatable, factors
that are peculiar to the unique confluence of circumstances of the particular
cases or to individual idiosyncrasies, such as charisma or exceptional leadership
abilities. Lastly, I wanted to examine factors that relate to interesting research
findings in the literature.
1.6 PREVIEW OF FINDINGS
Based on the criteria listed above, two sets of factors seemed particularly
noteworthy: the way the project has a high level of satisfaction from its frontline
workers.
After a brief overview of the necessary political, economic and historic contexts in
chapter two, I begin this analysis. The monitoras and their unusual dedication to
their work is the subject of chapter three. CET SUR utilizes at least two methods
to maintain this high level of dedication to the job. The first is offering the
monitoras opportunities to develop personal skills, not only the agroecology and
leadership skills specific to the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, but also
transferable skills such as basic numeracy and literacy. CET SUR also endows
the monitoras with considerable discretion over their work, such as their ability to
tailor program budgets to local preferences and their autonomy in recruiting new
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members to the program. While this discretion is not limitless, granting the
monitoras with some powers of decisionmaking enhances their job satisfaction.
Another distinction that separates the Toward Sustainable Cites Project from the
rest is the myriad partnerships it has formed with government agencies. This
network of relations ranges from a partnership with the sanitation department to
manage a compost plant, to funding from Vida Chile to build mud ovens.
The ability to network with government is a crucial survival skill for Chilean NGOs
as international funding has shifted away from this country following the transition
to democracy from the Pinochet dictatorship. CET SUR demonstrates
considerable skills in this regard. Two ways the NGO has been able to
accomplish this is the subject of chapter four. This chapter explores how linking
the program's concrete and visible project with the need of local elected officials
to deliver benefits to constituents can enable these partnerships. High profile
events related to program activities also contribute to healthy NGO-government
relations.
While the literature on urban agriculture has done a lot to point out the
potentialities of this activity, it has done less to examine the complex realities of
how these projects operate on the ground. Without a clearer understanding of
how to manage urban agriculture projects, they will not be able to live up to the
ambitious claims made in the literature. It is my hope that bringing the angle of
project analysis to a specific urban agriculture program can add nuance to the
claims made of urban agriculture by adding meat to those theoretical bones.
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HISTORY & CONTEXT
The urban agriculture program in Tome has evolved over the past twenty years
as the political, economic, and cultural landscapes in Chile have changed. This
chapter is dedicated to provide the necessary contexts-geographic, cultural,
economic, and political-to fully understand the complex and changing
environment in which CET SUR has been operating and to which the NGO has
been adapting.
2.1 GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT
Chile is divided into thirteen Regions (Figure 2-1), which
include twelve numbered regions and the Santiago ]Mxmmk
Metropolitan Region. The regions are numbered
sequentially from the northern desert tip of the country
bordering Peru to the southern territories of Tierra del
Fuego, and even a slice of Antarctica that Chile claims.
Tome is located in the 8th Region,33 an area slightly
smaller than Switzerland. Concepcion is the regional
capital and its metropolitan area is the second largest in
Chile with a 2002 population of 778,070." Tome is
located 13.5 miles north of Concepcion.
Figure 2-1: The Thirteen
Each of the thirteen regions is further divided into Regions of Chile
provinces and the 8th Region contains four: Concepci6n, Arauco, Bo Bo, and
Nuble (Figure 2-2). Tome is located in the Concepci6n province along with one
other town participating in the Toward Sustainable Cities Project. All other
3 The 8h Region is also known as the Bio Bio Region after Chile's largest river which runs through the
Region emptying out into the Pacific ocean at the Bay of Concepci6n.
3 CASEN, the National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (Encuesta de Caracterizacion
Socioeconomica Nacional). (2002). Source: Government of Chile. Available on line at:
www.gobiernodechile.cl/canal-regional.html?region=8
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participating towns are located in the province of Nuble. The 8th Region is further
broken down into 52 comunas, or municipalities, each with its own local
government.
- Nuble
Concepci6n
Blo Blo
Arauco
Figure 2-2: The Four Provinces and 52
Municipalities of the 8th Region
2.2 ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Regional Context
Economic activity in the 8 th Region of Chile is concentrated in the forestry
industry, the fishing industry, and the agricultural sector. The region boasts large
areas of high quality soils covering 2.9 million hectares of land, 52 percent of
which is dedicated to forestry and the rest to agriculture. The interior valley of the
region provides favorable conditions for wine cultivation in the Itata and Bio Bio
Valleys. The agricultural sector is increasingly export-oriented and is transitioning
from crops produced for internal markets-such as cereals and beans-to crops
that require a greater amount of processing, such as sugar beets and oats. A
recent trend in agricultural production in the region includes cultivating small, yet
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highly profitable crops such as organic produce, seeds, medicinal herbs and
bulbs.35
Economy of Tom6
The economy of Tom6, on the other hand, has been historically based in industry
and exporting. Tome, founded in 1544 by a Spanish explorer, is an old port city.
The town's first principle activity was the exportation of cereals, beans, wheat,
wine, dried fruit, and meat jerky, produced in the dry fertile interior of the region
to supply the fortune seekers of the California Gold Rush. From that time until the
early twentieth century, wheat produced in Chile for export to the United States
passed through the port of Tom6. At the turn of the century, the economy of
Tome became highly concentrated in the textile industry, which had three plants
in the area. These factories initially supplied the uniforms for Chilean soldiers
fighting the War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia, however, the textile
industry eventually made a name for Tom6 as the most important textile port in
Chile,36 exporting to the United States and Canada. This reputation would
change dramatically in the early 1980s when most of these plants could not
recover from the dual blow of lowered domestic tariffs on textiles and the Latin
American debt crisis. The Bellavista Oveja Tom6 plant, however, has weathered
the storm and continues to operate in Tom6. A new free trade agreement with
the U.S.A. promises to open new textile markets to Chile and Bellavista Oveja
Tom6 is seeking to capitalize on this potential growth. The owners are seeking a
$15 million dollar investment to upgrade the machinery in their plants.37 Perhaps
the future holds another wave of economic prosperity driven by the textile
35 Official website of the 8 h Region of Chile. Available at: www.octavaregion.com/
36 Information found on the Municipality of Tom6's website: www.tome.cl
37 Gonzalez, Maria Paz (July 21, 2003). "Bellavista Oveja Tom6 apuesta por allegar a nuevos mercados."
El Mercurio.
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industry, but at least a few Tome residents are incredulous. Many doubt they will
see the benefit of any new jobs created by this expansion.38
Poverty and the Mapuche Population
Poverty in the 8th Region is high relative to nationwide averages, and in Tome
this rate is even higher (Table 2-1). In 1998, the poverty line was set at
$968/year.39
Table 2-1: 1998 Poverty Rates40
Region Poverty Rate
National
8th Region
Tom6
23%34%
40%
The indigenous population of Chile suffers even higher levels of poverty. Eighty-
six percent of Chile's indigenous population (666,128 people) identify themselves
as Mapuche. The Mapuche population is concentrated in the 9 th Region of the
country where 33 percent of this population lives. While the 8th Region only has
about 9 percent of the country's Mapuche population, they bear a
disproportionate share of the poverty burden in the area. Fifty-two percent of the
Mapuche population living in the region is poor.
2.3 A POLITICAL ECONOMY HISTORY OF CET SUR'S WORK
The history of CET SUR's involvement in Tome is inextricably intertwined with
the political and economic upheaval in the second half of the twentieth century.
The Chilean experiment with socialism resulted in the election of Salvador
38 Interview with Rita Moya, CET SUR director (July 4, 2003) and informal conversations with UCHO
members in Tom6 (June 13, 2003)
39 Valdivieso, Gonzalo (1999). "El Desarrollo Local Sustentable: La Dimensi6n Humana." Master's Thesis
from the Universidad Internacional de Andalucia.
40 MIDEPLAN. (2002). Divisi6n Social, Departamento de Informaci6n Social, Encuesta CASEN 1998
Available at: http://www.mideplan.cl/casen3/ingresos/cuadros1998/inc98-13.xls
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Allende, the world's first freely elected socialist leader, in 1970. The dramatic
policies enacted by the Allende government generated a bloody military backlash
and coup only three years into his administration, propelling General Augosto
Pinochet into power for the next seventeen years. The road back to democracy
was a tortuous one, plagued by continued economic instability that eventually led
to a mobilization of civil society against the dictatorship. Once the transition back
to democracy began in late 1989, however, civil society has retreated and
modern Chilean society has become de-politicized and demobilized.4 42 This
series of radical upheavals set the stage for both the initiation of CET SUR's
work in Tom6 as well as the NGO's changing program strategies.
Because the past twenty years in which CET SUR's work has taken place
include turbulent economic and political transitions, it is useful to divide their work
into three distinct phases: military rule and economic crisis (1982-1989),
reinstitution of democracy (1989-1999) and the expansion of the project (1999-
present day).
Phase One (1982-1989): Military Rule and Economic Crisis
The first phase of CET SUR's work began in 1982 and lasted until the 1989
transition back to democracy from the Pinochet dictatorship. During this period,
the urban agriculture project was characterized by three qualities: (1) the small
scale of its reach to beneficiaries, (2) its focus on simple tasks and (3) program
operations that denounced the dictatorship but formed strategic alliances with
government programs.
The Center for Education and Technology (CET), a Santiago-based NGO, was at
this time offering technical assistance for agroecology programs, mainly in rural
areas surrounding Santiago, Temuco, and Chilos. In the early 1980s, CET began
41 Hipsher, Patricia L. (April 1996). "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile
and Spain." Comparative Politics. Volume 28, Issue 3. pp. 273-297.
4 Prosner, Paul W. (1999) "Popular representation and political dissatisfaction in Chile's new democracy."
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Spring 1999. Volume 41, Issue 1.
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plans to implement their program in Tome, since the town's precipitous drop in
per capita earnings due to the impact of the economic crisis had drawn national
attention.
This crisis was the confluence of both macroeconomic reform-famously known
as the tratamiento de shock, or "shock treatment," promoted by Pinochet's team
of economic advisors43 -and the Latin American debt crisis. The "shock
treatment" involved dramatically increased the price of goods, contracting the
money supply and cutting public spending to control inflation. The regime also
began to sell off those firms that had been nationalized under the Allende
government.44 However, a devalued peso coupled with lowered tariffs dealt a
major blow to domestic industries45 and local economies, struggling to cope with
the economic instability, began to falter. In 1982, several of Tome's textile
factories were driven out of business due to an inability to compete with a flood of
cheap imports. Shortly thereafter, 7,500 workers were left unemployed-nearly
half of the urban workforce. Poverty rose to 45 percent of the population of Tom6
while indigence rose to 19 percent. Average yearly income hovered around
$252. Food security became a pressing issue.46
This first phase of the program was focused on local self-sufficiency and largely
operated off the radar of official government policies. In these early days, the
program focused narrowly on one task-providing technical assistance to the
urban poor so that they could utilize unused spaces in their homes to grow food
for household consumption or sale. This very simple-sounding principle may
have contributed to the longevity of the program in Tome. Research on well-
performing projects has shown that projects that start out with a narrow focus
43 These advisors became known as the "Chicago Boys" for their close connections with the Univeristy of
Chicago's economics department led by Milton Friedman.
44 Collins, Joseph and John Leer (1995). Chile's Free Market Miracle: a Second Look. The Institute for
Food and Development Policy.
41 Ibid.
46 Tagle, Jorge (2001). Del Cultivo en el huerto al Cultivo de La Comunidad." FOSIS publication.
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have better performance over time as compared with projects that attempt to
perform too many tasks initially.47
However, the program also had a very modest scale during this period. Despite
the program's desire to work independently from (and opposed to) the Pinochet
regime, the program did explore strategic linkages with government programs
even in these early days. The initial ability of the program to expand from very
humble beginnings of ten people in 1982 to 100 people in 198648 was in large
part due to the program's ability to leverage the Minimum Employment Program
(PEM-Programa de Empleo Mfnimo) funds of the Pinochet administration. This
program, which paid below minimum wage, was an effort to stave off political
backlash by providing a base level of employment for workers.
Phase Two (1990-1998): Reinstitution of Democracy
Retum of Local Elections
When in early 1990 Chile transitioned back to democracy and local elections
were re-established,49 the residents of Tom6 were able to seize this strategic
opportunity to strengthen the urban agriculture project, which had already been
underway for seven years. Hundreds of residents who were already loosely
organized around the CET SUR program organized an open assembly to
demonstrate their work and have a public dialogue with candidates about local
poverty. This collaboration is cited as a turning point for residents who came to
see that they could influence local politics for the first time in nearly two decades.
Shortly after the new officials assumed power, they invited these groups to
47 Tendler, Judith. (1989) "What Ever Happened to Poverty Alleviation?" World Development. Vol. 17.
No. 7. pp. 1033-1044.
48 These numbers may be somewhat misleading unless you keep in mind the rolling nature of participation
and coursework in the program. In other words, these figures are not a cumulative tally of the total number
of beneficiaries but rather only represent those enrolled in classes in a given year.
49 During Pinochet years, the mayors were appointed.
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continue this dialogue and develop a local development program grounded in the
urban agriculture projects that residents presented at the open assembly.50
The first municipal elections brought CET SUR to the second phase of its work in
Tom6. At this point, CET SUR had a new faith in the long-awaited democracy,
and because of the recent mobilization of regular people against Pinochet, the
NGO had a sense that the new government would be characterized by greater
participation. CET SUR, therefore, welcomed and sought partnerships with the
new democratic government, including partnerships with the municipal
Community Development Department, the Department of Sanitation and
Beautification and the mayor. In the mid-1990s, the organization also began to
expand the variety of the activities it offered. CET SUR formed an alliance with
the Department of Sanitation and Beautification in Tom6 to initiate a city
composting plant that would engage over 1,500 residents in a training program to
separate their organic household waste for processing in the plant. They also
began partnerships with the schools forming eco-clubs for youth that began
recycling projects and projects to care for green areas of the city. CET SUR
initiated partnerships with third-party institutions, such as with the Chilean NGO
Trabajo para un Hermano and the Chilean social fund FOSIS52 to strengthen
efforts to spur microenterprises from the urban agriculture projects.
Self-Evaluation
In 1998, CET SUR underwent a self-evaluation to quantify the impact of its work
in Tome on combating poverty. The evaluation included a survey of 580
households participating in CET SUR's food security and microenterprise
program (100 percent of all participants) and detailed figures such as net
household savings from the program broken down by the food item produced
(Table 2-2). The study quantified the costs associated with these activities (such
50 Ibid. (Tagle)
5 Conversation with Rita Moya, CET SUR director.
52 Solidarity Fund for Social Investment (El Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversi6n Social)
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as for inputs like seeds for the garden, feed for the animals and yeast and fuel
costs for bread baking) and subtracted these costs from the estimated earnings
or savings on food to reveal the net benefit to households participating in the
agroecology programs. By the fifth year in the program, CET SUR found that
beneficiaries were realizing net savings (and/or earnings, if beneficiaries sold
their produce) totaling nearly $1,000. While this does not surpass the minimum
wage in Chile ($1902 per year in 2002), this does represent significant household
savings.
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Table 2-2: Net Household Savings for Beneficiaries5 3
Production ($US), Costs as a
Calculated from Sale Direct Costs Margin Percentage
Value of Produce ($US) ($US) of Value
YEAR 1
vegetables 18.8 0.77 18.01 4%
eggs 0 0 0 N/A
chicken 32.94 22.09 10.84 67%
rabbit 0 0 0 N/A
bread 198.38 127.11 71.27 64%
YEAR 2
vegetables 127.83 5.28 122.54 4%
eggs 223.8 179.7 44.1 80%
chicken 44.23 29.67 14.56 67%
rabbit 30.68 22.67 8 74%
bread 458.09 293.5 164.59 64%
YEAR 3
vegetables 144.24 5.96 138.28 4%
eggs 232.48 186.66 45.81 80%
chicken 44.23 29.67 14.56 67%
rabbit 50.25 37.14 13.11 74%
bread 551.88 353.59 198.28 64%
YEAR 5
vegetables 720.64 29.81 690.82 4%
eggs 255.61 205.24 50.37 80%
chicken 54.21 36.36 17.84 67%
rabbit 100.51 74.28 26.23 74%
bread 553.7 354.76 198.94 64%
5 Montero, A and A. Celis, R. Moya, A. Yurgevic (1998) found in Gonzalo Valdiviso Rodriguez's (current
director of CET in Santiago) master's thesis, "El Desarrollo Local Sustentable: La Dimensi6n Humana"
(1999). Universidad Intemacional de Andalucia.
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Phase Three (1999-Present): The Expansion of the Project
The current phase of CET SUR's work is characterized by the expansion to other
towns with the development of the Toward Sustainable Cities Project in 1999.
CET SUR's current work is also marked by explicit efforts to counter the
demobilization of society that began after the transition to democracy.
Mobilization and Demobilization
Following the transition to democracy, CET SUR began to work in a social and
political climate markedly distinct from the seventeen years of military rule that
preceded it. The period of military rule-coupled with the economic crisis in the
early 1980s-spurred a wave of political mobilization and popular uprising
against the Pinochet dictatorship. The economic crash opened up political space
for opposition to emerge. In shantytowns, groups such as ollas comunes
(community kitchens), comprando juntos (purchasing cooperatives), and
amasanderfas (bread baking groups) began to form to meet the dire food
security needs of residents in the face of the economic hardships of the times.
Political, educational, and human rights organizations and housing collectives
formed not only to address neighborhood needs but also to vent frustration
against the dictatorship. Community, labor and party organizations coordinated a
highly charged mobilization campaign with the goal of forcing Pinochet's
resignation. The protests peaked on July 2 and 3, 1986, when for forty-eight
hours, the opposition launched a general strike which shut down Santiago.54
In contrast to the collection action and political mobilization of the mid-1 980s, the
climate of the early 1990s was marked by power sharing between the military
and the political leaders of the Concertaci6n,55 the center-left coalition that
54 Ibid. (Hipsher).
5 Concertacidn por la Democracia, a coalition of seventeen center and center-left political parties that
have been the dominant political force in Chile since the transition to democracy. Candidates from the
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brokered the transition with the military regime, as well as by a distinct decline in
the mobilization of civil society. Both of these events had an impact on the
opportunities of the NGO and the program strategies it adopted.
The influence of the military's control on the democratic transition cannot be
discounted. The control the Pinochet regime wielded over the transition led to
pact-making agreements between elites instead of the new participatory style of
government for which many had hoped. The role of political pact-making in
transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy, especially in Latin America,
has been widely explored in the political science literature. A pact is an explicit,
though not necessarily publicly stated, agreement among political elites "which
seeks to define . .. rule governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual
guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it."56 Pacted democratic
transitions ensure stability and increase the odds that the emerging democracy
will be viable. However, "in a kind of political catch-22 ... pacted agreements
and concessions that may have made democratization possible often become
impediments to further democratic reform."57 For example, the continued
presence of such anti-democratic measures in Chile as designated senators and
the binomial election system58 ensure military veto power that limits the elected
government's ability to enact broad-based change.
Over ten years after the euphoric end of Pinochet's rule, Chileans recognize the
limitations of their democracy. This is reflected in a 1996 Latinobarometro survey
that found that only twenty-seven percent of Chilean respondents were satisfied
Concertacidn have won the three presidential elections since the transition. The current president, Ricardo
Lagos, is a member of the socialist party and served as the Minister of Education under Patricio Alywin
(1990-1996), and as the Minister of Public Works under Eduardo Frei (1996-2002).
56 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About
Uncertain Democracies. John Hopkins University Press. page 37.
57 Ibid. (Prosner).
58 The binomial election system stipulates that in Congressional elections, two candidates from the same
coalition party cannot receive both seats from a district unless the second-place candidate receives twice as
many votes as a candidate from another party. In practice, this assures that many seats in Congress go to the
coalition party sympathetic to the military regime that would otherwise go to Concertacion candidates.
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with Chile's democracy and only ten percent believed that democracy had
become fully established in the country.59
The demobilization and de-politicization of Chilean society forms a contextual
backdrop for the ongoing work of CET SUR in Tome and explains CET SUR's
recent preoccupation with the rebuilding of civil society. In an effort to counter the
demobilization of society, CET SUR has adopted an explicit goal to rebuild social
networks, empower the leadership of women, and build regional networks of
people who will mobilize on issues related to urban agriculture, biodiversity, local
knowledge, and indigenous and women's rights. CET SUR's work reflects this
new orientation through leadership development of monitoras, sponsorship of
seminars on the topic of rebuilding civil society, and the development of a
regional network of urban growers to become a political force for change.
This orientation toward the formation of networks was one of the reasons why
CET SUR began to envision the expansion of the program to neighboring towns.
Another motive was that CET SUR's ability to raise funds for the project for the
one town of Toms was beginning to dry up.60 Expanding the program to
neighboring towns was desirable, therefore, for political reasons but also to
continue to be able to raise funds from CET SUR's traditional international and
Chilean funders.
The expansion began when CET SUR asked the mayor of Tome to present the
program to other mayors in 1999 and inquire if they would be interested in
sponsoring the program in their respective towns. The initial response was very
positive; fourteen towns expressed an interest in sponsoring the program. Unable
to support work in fourteen towns, CET SUR scaled back the scope down to
seven new towns based on three criteria: geographic proximity, the political
support they received in the towns and the poder de la comunidad. El Carmen,
for example, was dropped because of its geographic remoteness (it takes about
59 Lagos 1997, 137-35; Linz and Stepan 1996, 217
60 Interview with Rita Moya, CET SUR Director. July 4, 2003.
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3 hours to get there). Other towns that CET SUR stopped serving for these
reasons were Chilldn Viejo, Portezuelo, Trehauco, Ninhue and Cobquecura.
Progress to Date of the Toward Sustainable Cities Project
A common evaluation measure is, of course, the number of beneficiaries reached
by the program. In Tome, the program, over its 20-year history, had trained about
5,000 Tome residents (around 16% of the population) in small scale, intensive
agroecology methods.61
In 2002, 673 beneficiaries were enrolled for Levels I and 11 of the Toward
Sustainable Cities Program (Table 2-3), a 54 percent increase over previous
years. 2 CET SUR documents cite this increase to the ability of local monitoras to
recruit beneficiaries more effectively than CET SUR staff (for more discussion of
this topic, see chapter three).
Table 2-3: Participation in the Toward Sustainable Cities Project (2002)6
61 Personal communication with Rita Moya. CET SUR Director. July 2003.
62 Ibid. (CET SUR internal report, 2002).
63 Ibid. (CET SUR internal report, 2002).
Level I (year one of program) 183
Level 11 (year two of program) 490
TOTAL ENROLLED BENEFICIARIES 673
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Table 2-4: Participation by Town
Hualqui 135
Bulnes 97
San Nicolas 92
Coelemu 92
Tome 82
Quirihue 82
Quill6n 55
Ranquil 38
TOTAL 673
These 673 beneficiaries were organized into twenty-eight groups and women led
twenty-five of them. In total, 88 percent of the beneficiaries of the program are
women. The monitoras in each town conducted a survey of beneficiaries to
estimate the amount of land on average that beneficiaries were gardening in their
homes and the amount of food produced per garden. For beneficiaries in their
first year of the program, this estimate ranged from 14.8 kilograms of food per
year per beneficiary (Hualqui) to 43.5 kilograms of food per year per beneficiary
(Quill6n).64 The average numbers are presented in Table 2-5.
" See Appendix I. for the complete numbers listed in the report.
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Table 2-5: Average Food Production per Family (2002)"5
Production of Vegetables by Family
Square feet of land 65.1
Production (lbs.) 54.9
Pound of food/square foot 0.8
Total families surveyed 395
This chapter has provided the necessary contextual information about CET
SUR's history in Tome, as well as the progress to date of the Toward Sustainable
Cities Project, to set the backdrop for my investigation. The next two chapters
begin the analysis section of this research.
65 Ibid. (CET SUR internal report, 2002).
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MOTIVATING THE MONITORAS
Often a key issue in project management is how to keep distant frontline workers
dedicated to their jobs. In fields ranging from community health to microcredit to
forest management, central offices carry out projects through dispersed frontline
workers. These workers are often the face that the organization presents to the
public because they have more interaction with the general public than central
office bureaucrats. These workers may also be the drivers for reform of failing
programs as demonstrated by recent research by Joshi, which documents how
frontline forestry workers organized through their union to push for reform of a
forest management program in West Bengal, India.66 However, because of the
difficulty of supervising remote staff, frontline workers might also be tempted to
shirk work responsibilities or even attempt to cheat the program.
To combat the potential problems associated with distant workers and to
encourage a high level of worker dedication to the job, central organizations seek
ways to motivate dispersed frontline workers. While raising pay is perhaps the
most obvious option, many organizations also experiment with a variety of non-
monetary factors to motivate workers. Witness the case of the frontline health
care workers in Ceard, Brazil:67 a publicity campaign launched there by the
central government provided valued community recognition for frontline workers,
a powerful factor in increasing worker dedication to the job and improving project
performance.
So if the dedication to the job of frontline workers is a cornerstone for good
project performance, what are the factors that do or could contribute to
dedication on the part of the monitoras? Maintaining a high level of commitment
on the part of the monitoras is essential, as CET SUR staff cannot constantly
supervise every monitora in every town, making sure that she is performing all
66 Joshi, Anuradha (February 2002). Roots of Change: Front Line Workers and Forest Policy Reform in
West Bengal. MIT dissertation.
67 Tendler, Judith (1997). Good Government in the Tropics. John Hopkins University Press.
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the tasks that are expected of her. I devote this chapter to answering that
question and identify several factors beyond the pecuniary variety that cause
frontline workers to have a high level of job dedication and fulfill work obligations
even when supervised from afar. The frontline workers in the Toward Sustainable
Cities Project-the monitoras-and their dedication to their work is the subject of
this chapter.
I do not mean to imply that financial incentives are not important, however.
Interviews with eight monitoras indicated that monetary factors were an important
motivational factor. While the monitoras'salaries are below the minimum wage in
Chile, they do represent a substantial amount of supplemental income-and for
families teetering on the edge of poverty, this additional income can make all the
difference.
I spoke with one monitora, Rosa Badilla, who was particularly candid about how
the salary influenced her decision to become a monitora. She has been in the
program for three years. She described how she was interested from the start in
becoming a monitora-despite the long training process-and how she only had
a minimal interest in gardening itself. She maintains only a small garden at her
house and does not desire a mud oven. Teaching is her true passion and she
prefers to use her skills to educate others. For her, the motivating factor in her
decision to become a monitora in the program was the fact that it would enable
her to generate a little income by teaching the classes.
Nonetheless, becoming a monitora probably would not be the first option for
someone who needs quick cash; it takes time and effort to become a monitora.
Recall the long training process described in chapter one: two years of
68 Calculated with the July 28, 2003 exchange rate of 701.61 pesos to the dollar reported at
www.latercera.cl.
69 "Gobierno sube salario minimo poco mds de lo anunciado." (July 28, 2003). La Tercera. The minimum
wage equals $159/mo or $1902/yr.
70 Interview with Rosa Badilla Sepdlveda. June 22, 2003.
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participation in the program as a beneficiary and another year of unpaid training
to become a monitora.
Furthermore, women who participate in the program as monitoras contribute
many unpaid hours to the program. While they are paid for the classes they
teach, the monitoras are not paid for myriad other activities in which they are
expected to participate. These activities can put substantial demands on their
time. One example of this intense dedication to the job that I found astounding
was that two monitoras were willing to travel three and half hours each way to
attend a two-hour meeting, which they were not paid to attend.
Therefore, what was particularly interesting was that the monitoras spoke with
equal emphasis of non-monetary motivational factors. Two such factors that
contribute to job dedication jumped out from the meetings and interviews I
conducted: the potential for leadership and personal development and the
discretion in decisionmaking granted by the CET SUR central office to the
monitoras. I also explore what is an untapped source of motivation in the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project: elevating the local status and/or community
recognition of monitoras and their work.
3.1 PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
The investment in human development that the Toward Sustainable Cities
Project offers the monitoras is an important non-monetary factor that contributes
to a high level of worker dedication. These investments include activities that are
directly related to the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, such as the training that
beneficiaries must undergo in order to become a monitora. However, an
extremely important motivating factor for the monitoras was an activity that was
only indirectly related to the mission of Project itself: the formal classes that CET
SUR offers to monitoras, which allow them to complete and receive certification
for their basic education.
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Recall from chapter one that there are no educational prerequisites to become a
monitora. What is required is that they demonstrate the required technical skills
as well as teaching abilities and have a willingness to give back to the
community. However, CET SUR has since found that enabling these women to
achieve a higher level of literacy is important in increasing their effectiveness as
monitoras. The tasks that CET SUR requires of the monitoras-managing
program budgets for their group, maintaining records and teaching their
classes-require a functioning level of reading, writing and mathematical skills.
The Ministry of Education has recently started a new program called Chile
Califica, which promotes adult education classes in an effort to make the regional
labor force-which has a relatively high percentage of adults in the regional labor
force (over 50 percent) that have not completed their high school education-
more competitive nationally and internationally. However, since the Ministry of
Education's expertise does not lie in the realm of recruiting eligible participants to
such programs, it has developed a program that enables third parties to offer this
training to their beneficiaries. Different non-profits sign up interested adults and
the Ministry selects programs to sponsor on a point-based system considering
the number of participants a particular NGO has signed up, and in particular, the
number of women and the number of poor enrollees. Participants in the program
can receive certification for the coursework they master and the NGO receives
compensation based on the number of modules that the students complete.
Students are given a diagnostic test before and after the class to measure this
progress.
In 2002, CET SUR began to offer these adult education classes to the monitoras
in order to up-skill these workers, meet a articulated desire of the women, and
receive a small amount of compensation (depending on how much progress the
women make) from the Ministry of Education. This program is also attractive to
CET SUR because they can combine the standard curriculum they are required
71 Interview with Rodrigo Martinez. Regional Secretary of Education. June 11, 2003.
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to teach by the Ministry of Education with coursework related to their programs.
For instance, CET SUR uses greenhouse construction to teach basic math
concepts and agroecology principles to teach science.
This type of up-skilling of staff can be a powerful motivational factor for workers.
In fact, at one of the group meetings that I attended, there was a very weak
response to the events that the field technician was announcing until he
mentioned that CET SUR would be offering these basic education courses in the
town starting the following year. At that point, many people began asking
questions about how to sign up or about how to bring the classes to their town.7
While CET SUR now offers these courses to all program beneficiaries, these
supplemental classes began as an attempt to up-skill the monitoras.
The high level of excitement and interest in these classes at the group meetings
demonstrated that this element of the program was in high demand. Part of the
reason that these skills are so desirable is that they are transferable-monitoras
who receive their high school diploma through this program will be able to carry
that asset with them even if they leave their role as a monitora.
3.2 WORKER DISCRETION
Another practice utilized by CET SUR that motivates frontline workers is
devolving decisionmaking authority to the monitoras over certain aspects of the
program such as recruitment and budgeting. Empowering workers to make
decisions about their work, rather than constantly carrying out instructions from
central staff, offers workers the flexibility and autonomy their crave to make their
work their own. One example of this is the case of health care workers in Cear&,
Brazil who appreciated their ability to expand their job definition from solely
preventive health care to some curative tasks in a way that gave them more
authority over their work and made it more interesting as well.74 Like these health
72 Interview with Rita Moya. July 4, 2003.
73 Observations from meeting of agroecology nuclei in Quill6n and San Nicolis. June 10 and 12, 2003.
74 Ibid. (Tendler, 1997)
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care workers, the monitoras in the Toward Sustainable Cities Project value being
able to make meaningful judgments about the programs they implement on the
ground. Elena Silva, one of the most experienced monitoras in the program from
Tome described that one of the best parts of being a monitora has been the
opportunity to do many different kinds of things, to continue to learn about
gardening and now even composting at the plant they've founded in the city. She
also stressed how much she has enjoyed the opportunity to go to other towns to
teach these courses.75 The speed with which Rosa Badilla Sep6lveda, a
monitora in San Nicolds, set up an impromptu meeting with the local health
director to question her about funding the program in the upcoming year,
revealed both the zeal she held for her work, but also the benefit to CET SUR in
granting the authority to manage the local program budget.76
The Toward Sustainable Cities Project grants the monitoras this discretion in
several ways and this section is dedicated to a discussion of two: budgeting and
recruitment.
CET SUR's Commitment to Worker Discretion
The Toward Sustainable Cities Project, like other CET SUR programs before it,
articulates a firm commitment to building local leadership and endowing these
leaders with the power to take ownership of the program. For instance, in its
mission statement CET SUR states that it strives "to support the development of
civil society, so that we will not be mere spectators in the decisions that come
from government or from other centers of power."77 Internal reports reveal that
the NGO seeks to foster "real participation of the citizenry through strengthening
leadership."78
75 Interview with Elena Silva, monitora. Tom6. January 2003.
76 Observations of the agroecology group meeting in San Nicolis. June 12, 2003.
77 From CET SUR's website, available at www.cetsur.cl
78 CET SUR internal report (December 2002). "Informe Narativo: Transici6n Hacia un Modelo de Ciudad
Sustentable: Desarrollo Local, Articulaci6n Institucional y Sustentabilidad en Regi6n de Bio Bio." This
report is a self-evaluation of their work from July 2002 to December 2002.
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What is revealed in CET SUR's operations, however, is that absolute worker
discretion is not in the best interests of the program. The autonomy of frontline
workers has its limits. Creative tensions between local and central agents are
needed to build structures of accountability. With too much central control,
frontline workers feel stifled and the program does not adapt to suit local realities
and preferences. With too much local control, the door is opened to rent-seeking
behavior.
Because the Toward Sustainable Cities Project is the first attempt by CET SUR
to expand the program to distant towns, it is also the NGO's first effort at
considering issues of enabling the discretion of distant community agents to
increase worker dedication to the job, among other objectives, while maintaining
some degree of programmatic control at the central level. This expansion
became an experiment, therefore, in which CET SUR aimed to find the right
balance between the devolution of decisionmaking to local agents and its
retention at central levels. Despite the newness of this task, CET SUR did have
a developed model on which to fall back. The NGO's nearly two decades of
experience in Tom6 organizing beneficiaries into groups and culling leaders from
them-the monitoras-who would then train and recruit new beneficiaries
provides a baseline model for the NGO with which to experiment in the new
towns.
Manaqing the Budget
As mentioned above with the example of Rosa in San Nicolas, budgeting is one
activity for which CET SUR devolves some discretion to frontline workers. CET
SUR allocates blocks of funding to the monitoras in each town at the beginning of
the programmatic year. The groups are then given the power to allocate this
money as they choose, within certain parameters. CET SUR may block out a
town's budget for materials for greenhouse and oven construction, tools and
79 World Bank Report. "Empowerment Tools and Practices." Available at:
www.worldbank.org/poverty/empowerment/toolsprac/too0 6 .pdf
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seeds. In this way, the staff gives the group some discretion over how to use
each block of money as long as it is actually used for the assigned purpose. For
example I witnessed a discussion in Hualqui during a meeting of an agroecology
group8" discussing how to allocate a block of funding devote to constructing
greenhouses. If a group is given $200 for materials to build greenhouses, the
group could choose to build one large greenhouse for $200, which the whole
group would then share, or they can choose to build four smaller ones for $50
each. While the group did not resolve the issue of whether they would build many
small greenhouses so that every beneficiary might have one at their house or if
they would build one or two large ones to share, the important aspect of the
conversation was that the group was able to have the discussion in the first
place. Beneficiaries voice their opinion but it is ultimately the monitora who
decides how to manage the funds. In this way the groups-through the
monitoras-are able to exercise some discretionary power in the budgeting
process and tailor broad program objectives (i.e. build greenhouses) with local
preferences (i.e. build five small greenhouses instead of one large one).
The Power to Recruit: Community-Based Targetinq
Another way in which CET SUR has enabled the discretion of the monitoras is in
recruiting new beneficiaries to the program. In fact, the NGO relies rather heavily
on its frontline workers to bring in new households to the program as central staff
have limited contacts with residents in the seven towns into which the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project has expanded.
CET SUR's orientation is to serve low-income households as demonstrated by
their self-evaluations and internal reports that detail the percentage of
beneficiaries that fall below the poverty line,81 and the program actively targets
the poor to ensure that the benefits of the program go to this population. The
Toward Sustainable Cities Project engages in two methods of targeting:
80 From observations of the "Grupo Huertos Familiares" agroecology group in Hualqui. July 1, 2003.
81 Ibid. (2002). Informe Narativo.
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geographic and non-pecuniary. The first method involves selecting towns in
which poverty is high as compared to the region. Tome, for example, had a 1998
poverty rate of nearly 40 percent82 while the rate was 21 percent nationally and
32 percent in the 8 th Region.83 The second method is a by-product of the nature
of the program itself. This program-which focuses on such activities as chicken
and rabbit rearing and composting kitchen scraps-is unattractive to elites and
the middle class. So while the program does not seem to overtly stigmatize
beneficiaries, leakage to the non-poor is minimized because the elites and the
middle class view agricultural activities-especially in the city-as distasteful.
One of the primary challenges posed by the expansion of CET SUR's work was
how to reach out and engage the target population in towns in which there was
no established base and how to form these new participants into the core groups
of the program. Having received political buy-in from the mayor's council who
invited CET SUR to bring their urban agriculture program to their town, the way
the Toward Sustainable Cities Project organizes itself initially is by using
established networks, such as existing government or community-based groups,
to publicize the program and recruit new participants. Due to the three years of
training required for monitoras, outside monitoras (usually from Tom6) commute
into these towns to teach the coursework. The monitora continues to commute
from Tom6 until monitoras have been trained from their own town.
Once monitoras are trained, the mechanism by which the program recruits new
members invovles the active participation of community agents. In referring to the
monitoras as community agents, I am somewhat extending the definition
provided by Conning and Kane84 in which they classify community agents as
"social or religious groups, single-purpose NGOs, or local elected officials or
82 CASEN survey (1998). Source: Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (Ministerio de Planificaci6n y
Cooperaci6n: MIDEPLAN). Available at: http://infopais.mideplan.cl
83 MIDEPLAN. (2002). Divisi6n Social, Departamento de Informaci6n Social, Encuesta CASEN 1998
Available at: http://www.mideplan.cl/casen3/ingresos/cuadrosl998/inc 9 8 -13.xls
84 Conning, Jonathan and Michael Kevane. (2002). "Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social
Safety Nets: A Critical Review." World Development. Volume 30, No. 3. pp. 375-294.
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governing bodies." The authors add that "the extent to which an agent qualifies or
not as a community agent depends on that agent's level of embeddedness in
local community affairs... the degree of involvement of the group or individual in
other functions and activities that imbricate them in poor sub-communities, or
their degree of involvement in the day-to-day community life of the poor through
residence, private business, or social activities." I extend this definition here to
include the local leaders that the program itself has cultivated.
I refer to the use of the monitoras to recruit new beneficiaries as community-
based targeting. This reference again borrows a definition from recent literature
describing community-based targeting as a state policy85 that contracts with
community agents to one or more of the following activities:
"(a) identify recipients for cash or in-kind benefits, (b) monitor the
delivery of those benefits, and/or (c) engage in some part of the delivery
process.'16
This project does employ community agents to do all three tasks outlined above.
Monitoras identify the beneficiaries of the program through their responsibility for
bringing in new participants into the program, monitor the benefits by managing
program funds, as well as engage in the delivery process by teaching the classes
and managing project funds devolved to the local level from CET SUR.
Benefits of Worker Discretion in Recruitment
The primary benefit of using monitoras to recruit new members to the program
that CET SUR notes is that the number of beneficiaries has gone up since this
has started. Recall from chapter one that new entrants into the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project has increased 54 percent from 2000 to 2002.87
85 One key distinction, however, is that here the programs are not administered by a state agency but rather
by an NGO.
86 Ibid (Conning and Kevane).
87 Ibid. (CET SUR internal report. 2002)
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Interestingly, the use of community agents to recruit new members and form
them into groups brings distinct benefits to the Toward Sustainable Cities Project
beyond increasing worker's dedication to the job. Other benefits include reduced
operating costs and the potential for better screening of beneficiaries through the
local knowledge of the monitoras to identify and recruit the poor into the program.
A central concern for any program on a tight budget is how to keep operating
costs low. One benefit of community-based targeting in general is that local staff
are often cheaper to employ than more professional staff.88 In the eight cases of
the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, CET SUR is able to pay the monitoras
less than fulltime staff both because the monitoras only work part time as well as
because they demand less pay. In this case, community-based targeting appears
to "increase the size of the cake" available to beneficiaries of the program by
reducing program operating costs.
Another argument for community-based targeting is that the local knowledge that
community agents can employ makes their work more efficient.89 However, scant
evidence supporting this claim surfaced in my research of the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project. Although monitoras certainly did possess increased
local knowledge as compared to the centralized staff, which would perhaps lead
to better screening methods, monitoras recruited new beneficiaries very loosely
and without any explicit criteria that I observed. They simply went door-to-door to
talk to families in their homes. Perhaps the monitoras employed some type of
selection of neighborhoods or made judgments about income level based on
their face-to-face interactions with potential participants in their homes, but I did
not see evidence of this or pose that question to the monitoras to whom I talked.
The primary benefit to CET SUR of the use of monitoras to recruit participants-
beyond enabling worker discretion over on-the-ground program operations-
seems to be the reduced program costs through using the cheaper resource of
local workers who work part-time for less pay and do not require benefits.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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Limitations on the Discretion of Monitoras
Despite the considerable autonomy of the monitoras in recruiting new
participants to the program, CET SUR does not delegate full discretionary power
to these frontline workers in the formulation and maintenance of the agroecology
groups, on which their salaries are based. Instead, CET SUR retains
fundamental oversight on that issue by setting clear and rigorous rules around
group formation to ensure that program resources are used efficiently and that
the monitoras do not cheat the system by forming many small groups instead of
combining them into larger ones to increase their salary. Because one of the
greatest costs to the program is the monitora salary, the NGO has an interest in
making sure that the number of beneficiaries in each class is as great as possible
without compromising the ability of the monitora to teach effectively. CET SUR
staff has determined that the optimal group size is between ten and fifteen
people, and CET SUR staff, therefore, retain the power to rearrange groups
formed by the monitoras if the number of beneficiaries per group dips too low.
CET SUR staff made frequent site visits to monitor these groups. I happened to
be observing the project at the beginning of a new program cycle,90 and CET
SUR staff from the central office were traveling to several towns to ensure that
the groups that were set up by monitoras had the number of participants that the
monitoras indicated. In Hualqui, for instance, a CET SUR staff member was sent
to check up on program groups and several groups had to be combined because
participation had dropped to low levels. She demanded that each group enrolled
for classes in the upcoming year provide a documented list of the participants.
She was firm with them: when she came back tomorrow for the list, only those
people with signatures on the form would be in the program. However many
signatures they had by tomorrow would be the people that they would consider in
their group. She also added that the monitoras needed to watch out for people
who come only on the days when they hand out materials and never show up
9 Because in the southern hemisphere the seasons are the reverse of ours and because this project's yearly
cycle is linked to the growing season, the project begins a new year July 1 of every year.
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again. She said that if people don't show up for two classes, they should kick
them out of the group. She described Hualqui as retrasado ("very behind") and
that they need to get their act together.91
Because these groups were previously taught by different monitoras, one would
lose out on the salary from teaching that class once the two groups were
combined into one. Because the monitoras know that their groups can be
combined or disbanded if participation is not sustained, they have a strong
motivation to make sure that the beneficiaries stick with the program. In this way
CET SUR builds incentives to maintain a low attrition rate in its programs as the
monitoras work to maintain their group size above a level that will lead CET SUR
to combine it with another.
The discretion granted to the frontline workers is significant in boosting worker
morale and dedication to the job, however, we should not mistakenly assume
that CET SUR grants workers absolute autonomy in decisionmaking in these
areas nor that granting this authority does not provide other benefits to the NGO,
which may be as important as improving worker morale. The restriction on
devolving full autonomy to workers stems from a need to create structures of
accountability between frontline workers and central staff. The related benefits
include reducing program operating costs by using the monitoras to carry out
activities less expensively than central staff and by targeting the poor more
effectively. These nuances and complexities in promoting worker autonomy
reveal that granting workers discretion in making decisions may be an important
factor in high worker morale and dedication to the job, but it is also delicate
balance of several factors that must be considered carefully.
3.3 THE UNTAPPED FACTOR: STATUS
The last factor that I found to be important to the monitoras was not only
unintentional to the program but also actively discouraged by CET SUR staff.
91 Observations from four group meetings in Hualqui. July 1, 2003. The groups were the Grupo Vegel, the
Grupo Huertos Familiares, and the Grupo Primavera.
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Based on conversations I had with the monitoras, however, and the evidence in
the literature about these types of frontline workers, this factor is worth
mentioning here as an important untapped factor in promoting and maintaining
dedication to the job. This factor is enhancing the community recognition and
appreciation the monitoras receive in their communities as a result of their title of
monitora. Despite the fact that CET SUR staff discourages any attempt to elevate
the status of the monitoras,92 wanting them to be motivated by other factors such
as civic mindedness or a willingness to "give back", several monitoras mentioned
how they appreciate the new respect they receive from group members and how
being a monitora has made them think differently about themselves and their
leadership capabilities.93
The CET SUR director also mentioned how the mere title of monitora is important
to these frontline workers. CET SUR attempted to change the name to promotora
in an effort order to downplay the potential for status raising, but the women
insisted on continuing to be called monitoras.94 The difference between being
referred to as a "monitor" instead of a "promoter" may seem slight, but the
distinction is important to these frontline workers.
This potential of using community status as a factor to maintain high levels of
worker satisfaction is illustrated in the Brazilian case of Cear& in which a media
campaign designed to highlight the effectiveness of the preventive health
campaign was meant to increase the popularity of the mayor, but had the
unintentional effect of raising worker morale.95 CET SUR could choose to adopt
this type of strategy that simultaneously publicized the work of the program while
also cultivates a sense of personal satisfaction on the part of the monitoras.
92 Interview with Marco Rojas. June12, 2003.
93 Interview with Elena Silva, Tom6 monitora (January 27, 2003) & with Rosa Badilla Sepdlveda, San
Nicolis monitora (June 27, 2003)
94 Interview with Rita Moya. June 9, 2003.
95 Ibid. (Tendler, 1997)
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While CET SUR staff believes that using the power of community status as a
factor is undesirable, because it distorts the intention of the program, which is
based on large ideals like community service, self-help for the poor, that imply a
certain degree of selflessness, the issue can be viewed from a different
perspective and may be one of nomenclature. Framing the issue of "enhancing
community recognition and appreciation" may be more palatable to the NGO
than attempting to "raise the status" of these workers, when the end result, in
fact, might be very similar. Regardless, instead of attempting to minimize the
natural human tendency to desire respect from one's peers, the program could
foster this positive effect by highlighting the important role these monitoras play
in their communities.
NETWORKS WITH GOVERNMENT
NETWORKS WITH GOVERNMENT
The Toward Sustainable Cities Project is unusual in that it challenges the
conventional wisdom about the lack of cooperation between NGOs and
governments. The term "NGO" stands for "non-governmental organization" and
encapsulates the separateness that frequently divides NGOs and government.
CET SUR's work in expanding its urban agriculture programs to the seven towns
that comprise the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, however, demonstrates a
vast network of relationships with government from agencies ranging from health
to education to sanitation. Developing support among elected officials has been
key in developing these networks.
Forming partnerships with government is crucial for the Toward Sustainable
Cities Project for several reasons. For one, these relationships enable the
program to tap into established government networks, such as neighborhood
associations, mother's groups or youth clubs. Access to established networks is
particularly important in towns in which the Project has no history or base, and
enables CET SUR to recruit new beneficiaries for the program more easily.
Secondly, the financial resources that government agencies or programs can
bring to the table provide essential capital to support the Toward Sustainable
Cities Project. Expanding the program to seven towns is a large and on-going
financial investment that CET SUR cannot make alone. For example, the
monetary commitments that Vida Chile has made to cover some of the material
costs of the program have been essential expanding the program to these seven
additional towns. Many program beneficiaries cannot afford to pay these costs
themselves and would not participate in the program if they were expected to do
so.96 As the partnership with Vida Chile appears to be drawing to a close in many
96 The flip side of this argument is that by not requiring any financial contribution from beneficiaries, the
Project creates a culture of dependency. This point came up in several interviews. However, another
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municipalities, CET SUR is attempting to broker new partnerships with
government, for example with the Programa Puente of the Chile Solidario
program. This FOSIS-sponsored program allocates money to the extreme poor
and has recently started allotting funds specifically for productive, or income-
generating, activities. CET SUR is attempting to broker a deal with municipalities
so that Programa Puente beneficiaries can use the funds apportioned for
productive uses to pay for their material costs in the Toward Sustainable Cities
Project.
Finally, the professional and technical expertise that municipal officials offer can
be invaluable. For instance, the municipal planning department in Tom6 has
created professional reports and mapping projects of the old municipal dump, the
potential site for the new compost plant.
In its ability to cultivate these networks with local, provincial and regional
government, CET SUR distinguishes itself even from its parent organization,
CET. In speaking with CET's director, he commented on how Chilean NGOs
received generous amounts of funding from international foundations and
governments during the Pinochet regime, but that since the return of democracy,
this funding has tapered off. As a consequence, NGOs have been forced to form
partnerships with government to stay afloat. In every other place other than
Tome, CET's work has waned due to this drop-off in funding and a lack of
participation from the local municipalities. For instance, in Lampa, a town in
which CET has been working, "the local municipality kept saying yes, yes, yes
but they never did anything. Tome was the only comuna in which the local
government actually got anything done."97
CET SUR's relative success in developing these networks with government
raises the question of how it has been able to do this when other institutions have
argument for charging a small fee for services exists: it could serve as an accountability mechanism for the
NGO to demonstrate that beneficiaries value the services it provides.
97 Interview with Gonzalo Valdivieso, CET director. Santiago, Chile. January 13, 2003.
NETWORKS WITH GOVERNMENT
failed. The benefits of these government partnerships for an NGO are clear-
especially when faced with new funding realities from international sources-yet
they are rather unusual for an NGO to develop. The story we typically hear is
how NGOs and government agencies do not cooperate. CET SUR seems to defy
this trend in its work with linkages to health, environmental, community
development, sanitation, and education departments. This chapter explores how
the NGO has been able to cultivate these networks with government and points
to two types of program aspects which have been more successful in gaining the
support of local elected officials: projects that provide concrete and visible results
and high profile events.
4.1 THE USUAL STORY
Certainly, I could also point to several examples of how the program had
difficulties in forming these linkages. For one, the Toward Sustainable Cities
Project, like many urban agriculture projects, lacks an institutional home because
its programming typically falls outside the purview of any one government
agency. For example, the program tackles environmental issues, as well as
urban agriculture, but receives only spotty funding from the National Commission
on the Environment (CONAMA). The National Institute of Farming and Fishing
(INDAP) cannot legally support the project because they are required by law to
focus on projects that fulfill certain criteria, one of which is that they work with
people who receive most of their income from agriculture.
CET SUR and FOSIS
Although the project also does not often fall within the purview of the Chilean
social fund FOSIS, which focuses narrowly on income-generating activities, CET
SUR and FOSIS have developed strategic partnerships, such as with
microenterprise formation in Hualqui and with compost plant construction in El
Carmen and Portezuelo (before CET SUR dropped these towns from the
Project). Many facets of the CET SUR program-such as the seed exchanges or
the leadership development programs-do not focus on generating an income. In
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fact, even in the income-generating aspects of the program, it often takes many
years of participation in the program before beneficiaries start to generate an
income from their gardens even though the beneficiaries gain immediate
household savings from their gardens. For institutions like FOSIS, that kind of lag
time is simply too long to wait. From CET SUR's perspective, developing the
groups and focusing on training lays the necessary groundwork for beneficiaries
to generate income more sustainably over time. Without making a judgment on
which is correct, it is safe to say that these approaches are often incompatible
and lead to few long-lasting partnerships. When partnerships do form, CET SUR
and FOSIS (as well as the similarly charged SERCOTEC) are uncomfortable
bedfellows.
These tensions are revealed in conversations with Rita, CET SUR's director, who
explained that FOSIS's and SERCOTEC's "/6gica empresia/' stresses
individualism and competition, which is not what CET SUR promotes. She says
that many of the agroecology groups that FOSIS and SERCOTEC have worked
with have reduced numbers as that type of competitive rhetoric turns people off.
She says that many people would rather earn a little less money, have less
stress in their life and work a little less. Rita explains that economic benefits are
not primarily what they work toward-they are much more about preserving the
environmental quality and develop citizen participation and political power.
This ideological split was further revealed in a conversation with Andrea Rivera, a
program manager at SERCOTEC, who though that CET SUR was not doing
enough to benefit the economic well-being of their beneficiaries. She went on to
say that she had doubts that CET SUR recognizes that increasing income is a
way to improve the quality of life for participants. She cited their anti-capitalist
slant ("anti-money, anti-economy, anti-globalization"). When I mentioned that
UCHO is thinking about making a private enterprise out of the compost plant, she
responded that it's taken five years for them to get that far.98
98 Interview with Andrea Rivera, project manager at SERCOTEC. June 19, 2003.
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CET SUR and Vida Chile
Despite ideological clashes, the project has made significant gains in building
partnerships with some government agencies. One particularly fruitful niche that
the CET SUR program found in government was through a new national health
initiative called Vida Chile. Vida Chile, in fact, is a new institution, designed to
encompass different departments at the national level including housing, the
environment, work, and education.99 Because the most challenging public health
problems in Chile are lifestyle choices that require a multi-pronged approach and
existing agencies were not communicating about work on parallel issues, the
idea behind the initiative was to bring these institutions together to work on
certain projects.100
Vida Chile is structured with national, regional and municipal offices. While
municipalities are somewhat free to develop plans based on local needs, these
plans must be approved by the regional offices and so must comply with national
objectives in order to secure funding. In each comuna there exists a Vida Chile
committee to create a Municipal Vida Chile Plan, which is ostensibly comprised
of the mayor, community development director, health director and planning
director, as well as representatives from community based organizations and
private enterprises. More often than not, it is only the health department that is
involved in the project.101
Despite Vida Chile's attempt to increase inter-agency cooperation, in many cases
it is only the departments of the health that continue to fund and support the
program. This reality is supported by studies, which have found that unless
99 See Appendix II for a complete listing of governmental organizations that are a part of Vida Chile.
10 Interview with Norma Pradenas, Assessor and Social Worker for the Provincial Health Department
Office in Concepci6n. June 25, 2003.
101 Ibid. (Norma Pradenas).
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circumstances are particularly urgent, individual agencies often do not have
anything to gain from cooperation but often much to lose.102
The responses from Vida Chile representatives at the local, provincial and
regional level about how they felt about CET SUR's relationship to the mission of
Vida Chile were overwhelmingly positive. For instance, despite orders from the
Regional Secretary of Health not to fund the CET SUR program, the Assessor
and Social Worker at the provincial level indicated that she planned to continue
to support the program in the town of Hualqui (the one town in her province in
which the program is underway) because she felt the impacts of the program in
terms of food security and microenterprise formation, as well as providing a
healthy way for women to engage in productive social activities was so
important. 103
Because local health officials have placed a high value of the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project, Vida Chile has been a regular funder of the program
on the municipal level. The Toward Sustainable Cities Project has consistently
been included in Municipal Vida Chile Plan that has been approved by the
regional government. However, last year the Regional Secretary of Health
announced that they would no longer fund the project. Local, provincial, and
regional health officials, as well as CET SUR staff and monitoras know very little
about why the funding is being denied to the project after many years of vocal
support. Health workers frequently mentioned that they suspected that it was
because the program had actually gotten too good at receiving program funds,
and that regional officials believed that the Toward Sustainable Cities Project
was acquiring disproportionate amounts of the Promotional Funds from the
department of health. In fact, about 40 percent in Coelemu and over 50 percent
in Tom6 of the Vida Chile budget was going to the agroecology programs. 104-105
102 Tendler, Judith (1993). "Reinventing the Projects." Chapter 2 in: New Lessons from Old Projects: The
Workings of Rural Development in Northeast Brazil.
103 Interview with Norma Pradenas. June 25, 2003.
104 Interview with Francisco Fuenteabla Health Department Director & Paulina Guenante, Social Worker at
the Dept. of Health. June 24, 2003.
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Furthermore, because this money was going to material costs, these funds were
benefiting a small number of individuals.106
However, a more likely reason why the Toward Sustainable Cities Project is
losing funding at the local level is that Vida Chile is losing political support at the
national level. President Lagos is shifting his administration's support (and
funding) away from this program and toward a new program that he could claim
as his signature health initiative. This program shifts the public health priority
away from preventive measures to curative ones, such as the construction and
maintenance of health clinics.
The dismantling of this project will put an end to what was characterized as a
positive relationship for both CET SUR as well as for the many health workers
with whom I spoke. The centralized structure of government in Chile, in which
municipal governments are essentially administrative agents of central
government, makes initiatives like Vida Chile particular susceptible to changes in
national political winds. This upheaval can lead to considerable turbulence for a
project like the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, which is looking to form long-
term relationships with government agencies. As the Vida Chile money dries up,
the Toward Sustainable Cities Project is left with no stable partnerships with
government.
4.2 DELIVER BENEFITS TO CONSTITUENTS
Despite the conventional wisdom about the animosity between NGOs and
government and the illustrations of this that I provided above, in the following
sections, examine ways local electoral politics has had a positive impact on the
Toward Sustainable Cities Project and ferret out elements of the program that
were useful in gaining the support of local government officials. Two types of
105 Interview with Paulina Quintana, Vida Chile Director, Tom6. June 23, 2003.
106 From Interviews with Paulina Quintana, Tom6 Vida Chile Director (June 23, 2003), Norma Pradenas,
Assessor and Social Worker for the Provincial Health Department Office in Concepci6n. (June 25, 2003)
and Rita Moya, CET SUR director (June 9 and July 4, 2003).
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examples illustrate the ways in which projects can use natural forces of local
electoral politics to work for a program. The Toward Sustainable Cities Project
uses two basic needs of elected officials to work for the program: the need to
provide visible and concrete benefits to constituents and the need to raise their
public profile. These examples build on previous research in the Brazilian state of
CearA, which demonstrated that allowing projects to be remodeled to
accommodate the political needs of governors can lead to better project
performance. 107
I will start my analysis of ways to build local political support and networks with
government by presenting two examples of activities that generate concrete
and/or visible benefits for constituents. Linking program objectives to deliver
benefits to beneficiaries with political realities to deliver to constituents is a way
projects can build networks with government. These benefits can be of either a
private or public nature as the two examples that I explore demonstrate: mud
ovens in the homes of program beneficiaries and the large infrastructure projects
of the compost plants. Elected officials favor projects that produce these types of
tangible benefits because they serve as a lasting reminder to constituents of
what their administration has provided.
Mud Ovens in San NicolAs: Buyinq Materials, Buying Votes?
The first of these examples involves mud ovens in San Nicolds. With a total
population of just under 10,000, of whom only 35 percent live in the town itself, 108
San Nicolds is one of the smallest and most rural of the towns participating in the
Toward Sustainable Cities Project.
107 Tendler, Judith (1993). New Lessons from Old Projects: The Workings of Rural Development in
Northeast Brazil. Operations Evaluation Department. The World Bank. Tendler identified four ways good
governors might improve project performance by adapting programs to their political needs: (1) shortening
project timelines so that the current administration could claim the results of the project, (2) "massifying"
the project to reach a greater number of beneficiaries/constituents, (3) narrowing down the scope of the
activity to "a single activity, single organizing logic, or a narrower or different geographic area;" and (4)
addressing urgent problems.
108 2002 population figures from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Available at:
http://www.gobiernodechile.cl/canal-regional.html?region=8
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I accompanied a field technician to the town to discuss the program's budget
crisis for the up-coming year. The project in San Nicolas is in its third year, and
its budget has been steadily decreasing over that time from 8,000,000 (slightly
under $11,500) pesos in the first year to only 1,200,000 pesos (just over $1,700)
for the upcoming year. In the first year, FOSIS contributed generously to the
program but has since been phasing out funding. In the upcoming year, FOSIS
will not contribute anything to the program in San Nicolas. According to the CET
SUR field technician, FOSIS is no longer involved in the project because the
social fund has decided to focus their efforts on microenterprise type projects and
that these groups simply are not at that stage.109
Luckily for San Nicolas, not all government funding
sources have dried up. Unlike many towns in which
Vida Chile has totally retreated from funding the
Toward Sustainable Cities Project, in San Nicolds
they have agreed to fund some material costs.
However, Vida Chile was quite specific about what
they would fund: only the material costs associated
with the first level of the program. This specificity
seemed strange since the program is going to have
materials costs associated with courses in three
levels. For example, in the first year, most of the
costs are for the garden and are associated with such
inputs as seeds and materials to make the ovens. In
Figure 4-0: A Typical Mud Oven the second year, material costs go into the
greenhouses, while in the third year, program costs
go to inputs for jam-making or other skills that beneficiaries could use to start
microenterprises. Why then was Vida Chile insisting on funding only materials for
first-year projects?
109 Personal communication with Marcos Rojas. June 12, 2003. Originally, FOSIS was working in three out
of the 14 original towns that were selected for the project.
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The answer came during a brief meeting with Silvana Neira, the project director
for Vida Chile in San Nicolas. The meeting was impromptu, arranged on the fly
by the monitoras and the CET SUR field technician to make sure that Vida Chile
would commit some funds to the program in the coming year. Silvana reassured
the monitora and CET SUR staff that they would contribute to the project. Silvana
seemed particularly interested contributing to the material costs of the mud
ovens.
The field technician later he revealed the logic: the mayor wants to be seen as
providing concrete benefits-like the ovens-to constituents. In a sense this is
like buying votes, he explained.'10 Characterized more benignly, the mayor-like
any skilled elected official-needs to devote limited government resources to
projects that provide concrete benefits to the largest number of people. Mud
ovens are cheaper to build than greenhouses, which might the next most
desirable product to deliver, and therefore can be supplied to more households.
These ovens are also highly valued by constituents because since they utilize
wood fuel (some beneficiaries also use cardboard) instead of costly gas, they
provide significant savings on fuel costs."'
The mud ovens illustrate one way to tie project goals to local political realities in
which government officials keep an eye to the next election. If the fundable
options for the project can be broken up into discrete activities, offering the option
to fund items that give tangible rewards to supporters, such as ovens for their
homes, will most likely generate the most enthusiasm and support from local
government officials. This may be another incarnation of the "menu approach"-
or offering elected official options to choose from according to their political
needs-that research found that the more successful World Bank projects in the
CearA province utilized. 12 The approach of offering elected officials a variety of
110 Personal communication with Marcos Rojas. June 12, 2003.
" Interview with Valentina Pina, monitora from Bulnes. June 27, 2003.
112 Ibid. (Tendler, 1993).
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options from which to choose enables government agents to select projects that
best align with their political realities.
Compost Plants
Another popular pet project of local officials are the composting plants promoted
by CET SUR. In every town, mayors, planning directors, sanitation workers, and
health directors expressed their enthusiasm about these plants. 13 As the mayor
of Quirihue explained to me that there is no reason why a mayor would object to
a project like that that delivers such tangible results to his constituency. 14
Differing considerably from the development of small-scale, intensive gardens in
people's private homes, the compost plants are obviously large infrastructure
programs, which benefit the general public and require large and "lumpy"
investments up-front as well as continued management and maintenance over
the long-term. For this reason they are a much more difficult task to accomplish.
Despite the many complications of these projects both in terms of coordination as
well as cost effectiveness, they continue to garner the support of local officials
and work as a way that CET SUR has formed networks with government.
The compost plants have not only secured the support of local officials but of
outside funders as well. Table 4-1 reveals the domestic and international sources
of funding CET SUT and local governments have received for the plants.
113 Interviews with Raul Andrade Vera, mayor of Quirihue (June 26, 2003), Nicanor Venegas (June 18,
2003), Elena Salveera, health director in Hualqui (June 26, 2003) and Jorge Negrete, Tomd planning
director (June 23, 2003).
114 Interview with Raul Andrade Vera, mayor of Quirihue. June 26, 2003.
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Table 4-1: Outside Sources of Funding for Compost Plants115
Funding Source Town Amount Year Purpose
America's Fund Hualqui $43,000 2001 Compost Plant
National Fund for Regional
Development Tom6 N/A N/A Compost Plant
The Belgium government Tome N/A N/A Compost Plant
Transitioning the compost
Trabajo para un Hermano Tome N/A N/A plant to the UCHO
FOSIS El Carmen $50,000 2001-2003 Compost Plant
FOSIS Portezuelo N/A N/A Compost Plant
In this section I will go into more detail about the way the compost plants
generated political support and often opened up networks in government.
However, first of all, I will use the compost plant in Tome as an example to
describe how these plants function.
Waste Separation and Training
The raw material for the compost plants is largely comprised of the kitchen and
yard scraps of Tome residents, although
the plant has recently started to collect
organic waste from schools and hospitals
as well. The city provided buckets to
1,500 residents and the UCHO ran a
training and publicity campaign promoting
composting. After eight years of
operation, however, only about 40 percent
of those households continue to separate Figure 4-2: Collection of Organic Waste in Tome
their wastes and leave it out for collection.
115 Table 4-lis a partial list based on information I gathered from interviews.
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Participating household leave buckets of organic scraps out for collection on
Mondays and Thursdays.
Collection and Processing
The sanitation department runs their
trucks along an abridged collection
route twice a week to collect the
organic material. The trucks deposit
the waste at the plants and workers
pile the material into piles and cover
them with straw.116 The digestion
period lasts for 45 days, with workers Figure 4-3: Compost-making in Tom6
turning the piles every 15 days or
when the internal temperatures of the piles reach exceed 140 degrees
Fahrenheit. The workers carefully monitor the temperature of the piles to make
sure that the material is degrading rapidly and that the interior of the pile
continues to get the necessary oxygen for biodegradation. After the digestion
phase, the piles are moved into
smaller piles for the maturation stage,
in which they are treated with worms.
This phase also lasts about 45 days.
Finally, the compost is sifted and
stored in small plastic bags for
redistribution to the households that
participated in separating their Figure 4-4: Monitora with worms
waste.117
116 Three full-time workers are employed at the plant through the city's employment program. These
workers receive the minimum wage.
117 Observation from a meeting of CET SUR staff, Tom6 sanitation department technicians, UCHO
representatives and compost plant workers. June 13, 2003.
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Management of the Plant
The one plant currently functioning in Tom6 is owned and operated by the city,
although the UCHO is currently in talks with the sanitation and planning
departments about transferring ownership to the group. Every indication from
government officials, CET SUR staff and beneficiaries is that this plan to transfer
ownership will move forward.' 18 When this happens, the city will still collect the
waste in the trucks owned by the sanitation department, but they will pay the
UCHO a small amount to dispose of it, like they would pay for waste disposal at a
landfill.
The Trash Crisis in Tome: Costs to the City of Closing the Dump
Despite the local support these compost plants have garnered in every town,
Tome is the only one where the composting plants have actually been fully
implemented. Eight years ago, CET SUR received money from the National Fund
for Regional Development for the construction of the plants in Tom6. One plant
is currently in full operation, while one was forced to close down due to nuisance
problems related to odors and insects. A third plant is planned for construction on
the old municipal dumpsite, which CONAMA has forced the city to close. The
reason for this limited success of the compost plants goes back to the
complicated nature of the task itself: the need to train residents to separate their
waste, to run collection trucks on extra days, and to coordinate with not only an
NGO on the project (CET SUR) but also a community-based organization (the
UCHO).
In Tome, however, a looming waste management crisis has tipped the balance in
favor of the compost plants despite this difficulty. The city has been dumping its
trash for twenty years in an eight-hectare dump that never had authorization from
CONAMA to operate. Ten years ago the Department of Sanitation and
Beautification started to partially manage the in-coming waste. The department
118 From Interviews with Tomd Planning Director (Jorge Negrete), the UCHO, CET SUR staff (Director
and Field Technicians) and Tom6 sanitation workers.
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began to compact the trash, put levels of soil between the waste layers and
install ventilation pipes. Still, due to the recent collapse of the dump, the city is
developing a plan to close it permanently. In fact, the town actually has not
disposed of any trash at the site since the end of 2002, when it was covered.
One large portion of the land is so contaminated that the Health Department is
requiring the town to close it off indefinitely or, "for thousands of years."' 19
Because the city is forced to close the dump, they now have to pay to transport
and dispose of municipal waste at a distant sanitary landfill. While the dump is
only a little over a mile outside the city, the landfill in Concepci6n is over fourteen
miles away. To make matters worse, that landfill is quickly reaching capacity and
when it closes, the only remaining disposal option is over thirty miles away in
Coelemu.
Benefits of Composting
Waste is in the eye of the beholder. In Tome, nearly 60 percent of the waste
stream is organic and therefore could potentially be composted. Clearly, the
potential of avoiding the costs of transporting and disposing of waste-especially
when these costs are increasing dramatically-is a powerful incentive to take
action.
While the advantage of avoiding the transport and disposal costs might be the
most tangible for municipalities, it is not the only benefit the compost plants offer.
Improving the quality of degraded urban soils and encouraging a method of food
production that is free of agrochemicals are additional, but perhaps from the
perspective of government, only ancillary benefits of the plants.
Complications of Composting: Nuisance and Incentives to Participate
Although the benefits of these plants can be compelling, the drawbacks can also
be potent. Nuisance issues, for example, can be a big problem at these plants.
119 Interview with Jorge Negrete, Tom6 Planning Director. June 23, 2003.
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As one worker put it, "we're not recycling perfume here."420 In fact, as mentioned
above, one plant was forced to close due to nuisance issues and its location near
a school, even though the plant was a prior use. The odors and insects that the
plant attracted drew vocal complaints from parents and teachers. While the
sanitation department hopes to reopen that plant soon,121 field technicians from
the sanitation department of and from CET SUR are working together to maintain
the other functioning plant, which is located in a residential area, so that the odor,
insect and rodent problems are avoided. I attended one meeting at the plant on
how to resolve these issues, and the problem was unfortunately still evident: the
smell was at times quite offensive.
Sustaining the participation of households to continue to separate their
household waste and leave it out for collection and delivery to the compost plants
has proven to be another complication in the project. As mentioned earlier, only
600 households of the 1500 trained continue to put their organic waste out for
pick-up.122 This low participation rate means that the plants receive only a
fraction of the inputs they require to operate at full capacity.
However, since the compost plant near the school was forced to close, the other
plant has been operating at full capacity and is actually unable to process all the
material delivered to it by the city. This plant now receives the steady stream of
organic material that previously went to two plants. Prior to that plant's closing,
however, both plants were operating at less than 60 percent capacity.123 The
problem was primarily one of access to inputs. Yet the city, with cooperation from
CET SUR, is planning a new compost plant on the site of the old municipal
dump. The city seems determined to increase the household participation rate.
120 Observation from a meeting of CET SUR staff, Tom6 sanitation department technicians, UCHO
representatives and compost plant workers. June 13, 2003.
121 Interview with Nicanor Venegas, project engineer. Tom6 Department of the Environment and
Beautification. June 18, 2003.
122 Interview with Jorge Negrete, Tom6 Planning Director. June 23, 2003.
123 Interview with Jorge Negrete, Tomd Planning Director. June 23, 2003. The plants process 103 tons per
year when the capacity is around 180 tons.
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Consequently, the city is looking for ways to
strengthen incentives to participate. The city
already distributes bags of compost to the
households that participate in separating their
waste, but that alone has not been sufficient.
Another incentive that the planning
department has explored is waiving the trash
collection fee for households that participate.
This fee, which is slightly more than $8.00 per Figure 4-5: Plant worker with a finished bag
year, is folded into property taxes for the few of compost to distribute to households thathave participated in separating their waste.
households are actually required to pay this
tax. For the remaining households whose property is appraised below the taxable
level, the city is responsible for collecting these fees door-to-door, an unattractive
and difficult task. Recuperamos muy poca plata, casi nada ('We recover very
little money, almost nothing"), attested the municipal planning director, adding
that they hardly bring in enough money going door-to-door to pay the person's
salary who does that job. Furthermore, the income level of many households falls
below the cut-off point for charging for trash collection. All told, only about 10
percent of households pay this fee.'24 Because so few people currently pay for
trash collection, providing incentives to participate in the composting program by
waiving these fees will not be a very effective incentive. Still the municipality
continues to explore different possibilities to increase participation.
The Economics of Composting
Several factors complicate the cost effectiveness of these compost plants. One is
the low participation and collection rate. When functioning at what the planning
director described as their full functioning capacity of 180 ton/year, the plant
would only net around $3500, according to a study by Trabajo para un Hermano
124 Interview with Patricia Hormazabal, Geographer and Management Coordinator at CONAMA Regional
Office in the 8th Region. June 11, 2003.
CHAPTER FOUR
financed by the America's Fund.125 When the collection rate is only 60 percent of
what was planned, the cost effectiveness dips to precariously low levels.
Another factor that jeopardizes the costs effectiveness of composting is the low
price of compost's nearest competitor in the marketplace, tierra de hoja. Firms
collect this product, which literally translates as "earth from leaves," from the
forest bed-much to the chagrin of environmentalists who note how the practice
depletes forest soils of necessary nutrients-and are able to sell it for low prices.
At the Home Store, the Chilean equivalent of the Home Depot, bags of tierra de
hoja sold for 5 kg = 930 pesos (186 pesos/kg) while bags of tierra organica (or
compost) sold for 4 kg = 995 pesos (248.75 pesos/kg).
Also significant factor is the low cost of waste disposal. Until towns are forced to
internalize the full costs of waste disposal-instead of externalizing the long-term
environmental hazards-the financial incentives to separate organic wastes for
composting may not exist. In Tom6, the city is beginning to internalize these
costs by being forced to dispose of its waste in a sanitary landfill as opposed to
merely the town dump, which is building political will for waste management
strategies like composting to emerge.
Composting in Hualqui and Quirihue
Aside from Tom6, no other town in the Toward Sustainable Cities Project has
successfully completed a composting plant. Two towns-Hualqui and Quirihue-
had ambitious plans to do so, but in both cases, the projects were undermined
before they got off the ground. Interestingly, neither of these towns is facing the
type of waste management crisis that is confronting Tome. Both towns continue
to use nearby dumps for trash disposal and because they have not yet collapsed,
CONAMA has not intervened. Although in both of these towns government
125 Granifo, Jorge (March 2002). "Estudio de Planta compostaje Uni6n Comunal de huertos Organicos de
Tom6." Through the project "Expansion y consolidaci6n de actividades de reciclaje de residuos s6lidos
domiciliarios de Tom6."
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officials strongly supported the project from the beginning, once complications
developed, the political will to see the project through to fruition disintegrated.
In Quirihue, despite the mayor's willingness to donate his own land to the project,
he was not willing to spend the political capital to overcome obstacles that arose.
The primary problem in this town was siting the plant. According to CET SUR, it
was CONAMA's red tape on siting that undermined the plans to build the plant.126
The city found what they thought was a suitable location for the compost plant on
their landfill but CONAMA did not clear the site. According to the mayor,
however, it was CET SUR's requirements that the plant be on municipal land that
led to its early death. In any case, despite the mayor's comments that any mayor
would support the composting plants because they demonstrate that government
is hard at work for the people,128 the first major obstacle in the road derailed the
project.
In Hualqui, plans to construct a compost plant encountered other difficulties.
Despite remarkable initial support, the mayor threw in the towel rather than
attempt to free the project form the capture of local elites. In this case, these
elites were neighborhood association leaders recruited to manage the grant
money received for the project. 129
After an optimistic first year in the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, local
officials in Hualqui sought outside funding to support the construction and
management of a composting plant. The planning director applied to the
126 Interview with Rita Moya, CET SUR Director. July 4, 2003.
127 In an interview with Rita Moya, the CET SUR director, she implied that CONAMA was in bed with the
landfill companies. These companies are foreign-owned and she noted that it is not in their interest to have
a recycling plant taking away the source of their profit. She said that they had a meeting with all the mayors
invovled in the project (from the 8 comunas) and representatives from CONAMA and at the last minute,
CONAMA withdrew support for the proposal. They instead are subsidizing the santiary landfills, helping to
pay for transfer stations for municipalities. When I asked her why she though CONAMA had changed their
minds like this she said she supposed there are dark forces at work.
128 Interview with Raul Andrade Vera, the mayor of Quirihue. June 26, 2003.
129 Information reported here about the compost plant in Hualqui came from an interview with the health
director, Elena Salveera on June 26, 2003.
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America's Fund for a grant to implement a composting program. The application
was successful and the town received a grant for 30,000,000 pesos (-$43,000).
The planning director developed an implementation plan, acquired the land and
even bought 1,500 buckets to distribute to households to separate their wastes.
Because one of the objectives of the America's Fund is to strengthen civil
society, they require that the projects they fund be operated by a legally
recognized community based organization. However, the agroecology groups
were only one year into the program, and they were not ready to incorporate
formally into a group. Instead, the municipality contracted the neighborhood
association to operate the project.
Unfortunately, the neighborhood association leaders were a poor choice. Not
only were they inexperienced project managers and not necessarily
representative of the community, the leaders of the neighborhood associations
also had no commitment to the idea of a compost plant. However, they suddenly
had a salary, an office, a cell phone and a computer, which made the other
neighborhood association leaders and members envious. No one understood the
process for administering the funds and implementing out the plan, not even the
mayor and the health department who were the ones who secured the funding. If
the agroecology groups had formed into a group like the UCHO and they had
been the ones to administer the project, perhaps the project would have fared
better. As it was, the difficult task of implementing a compost plant was left to
actors outside the Toward Sustainable Cities Project who had no allegiance to
the program and no incentive not to cheat the system.
In the end, the composting plant in Hualqui never got off the ground, despite the
fact that local officials leveraged outside funding for the project and secured land
and materials. The high expectations of the project led to considerable
frustrations, especially on the part of the mayor who was quite aggravated about
the compost program and the obfuscation on the part of the neighborhood
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association leaders. Instead of developing a way to make it more transparent,
however, the mayor simply gave up on the whole project.
Initial support of myriad local officials from the mayor to sanitation workers and
planning directors for the compost plants demonstrate the way local governments
get behind visible and concrete projects that could generate political capital for
elected officials. However, the complicated nature of the task of building,
operating and maintaining a compost plant, in contrast to the relatively simple
task of building a mud oven, has limited the capacity of governments to see
these projects through. Despite the limited success rate, these plants have still
served as a springboard for CET SUR to develop networks with government.
4.3 HIGH PROFILE EVENTS
While the mud oven and compost plant examples in the previous section
highlighted ways in which project goals can tap into the need of elected officials
to deliver results to constituents (some more successfully than others), this
section will illustrate the ways high-profile events can generate political support.
These events provide a forum for elected officials to both demonstrate their
connection with the interests of the people as well as raise their public profile. In
this section, I review two such types of events: the municipal fairs in Hualqui and
the seed exchanges that I observed in Quill6n and Quirihue.
The Fair in Hualqui
The fairs in Hualqui have become major town events ever since the beneficiaries
of the Toward Sustainable Cities Project began to steal the show. The fair has a
record turnout in 2002, in which the women sold out of all their wares: the
roasted corn, juezillo (peach juice) and moti (shelled wheat), different types of
bread, yogurt and carrot desserts, and new kinds of empenadas including pear
and Swiss chard. As a result, the town expanded the fair to two two-day events in
January and February of 2003. At both occasions the central plaza was mobbed
with people and the women again sold out of all their goods. These fairs now
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have a reputation for their gastronomic delights because, even though there are
also some folk singers and artisans that attend, their skills are eclipsed by sights
and smells of the food prepared by the Toward Sustainable Cities Project
beneficiaries.
The event has also attracted media attention. An article from the regional
newspaper, El Sur, detailed the success of these women, which has turned the
annual corn festival into something much bigger.131 In the article, three women
from the program were interviewed and discussed their experiences with the
Toward Sustainable Cities Project. They described their experiences forming
microenterprises with the help of FOSIS. One woman explained the value of the
program saying, "our comuna has campesina roots and that is what we are trying
to preserve."
In Hualqui, the Toward Sustainable Cities Project has also been relatively
successful in attracting participants: in the first year they had 30 families, the
second year 90 and last year they were up to 190. Also striking about the project
in Hualqui is the number of microenterprises that have sprung up as offshoots of
the program. The women have started a small catering business, which serves
large municipal events. Several women have opened up a new confectionary
store with a small grant from FOSIS. A small kiosk, from which another group of
beneficiaries have plans to sell empanadas, has also opened up in front of the
health clinic.
Elena, the Health Director in Hualqui, described one of the reasons why the
program has done so well as the visibility the program has garnered from the fair.
The early days of the CET SUR's involvement in Hualqui took place in much
different circumstances than it did in Tome, which started during the dictatorship.
Because the project has been able to tap into government resources, it has
130 Interview with Elena Salveera, Director of Health. June 26, 2003.
131 entitled, Fiesta en Hualqui, Lo mejor del campo ("The Party in Hualqui, the Best of the Country"), dated
March 2, 2003. The article
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developed at a much faster pace than it did in Tome where, for the first eight
years or so, it was practically invisible. She explained that in Hualqui, they
advertise this project and try to get people to participate. The fairs have been
crucial to this visibility and have brought out the mayor and other elected officials
who have made public statement supporting the Toward Sustainable Cities
Project. She says the mayor likes big events such as the artesian fair because
they are high profile events that help him look good.
The Seed Exchanges
Another way in which the Toward Sustainable Cities Project is able to draw in
local political support for their work is through the two seed exchanges-or
Trafkintus.
The word Trafkintu is from the Mapuche language, and a Trafkintu is a tradition
of the Mapuche people for the continued supply and renovation of seeds. CET
SUR and UNDP sponsor the activity to preserve the biodiversity of the seed
stock in Chile, especially rare species of plants, and the knowledge of how to
save and grow them. CET SUR has been organizing these events in the 8th and
9th Regions of Chile over the past couple of years. In the 9th Region, both Hualqui
and Tome have hosted these events. In June, Quill6n and Quirihue hosted
Trafkintus.
At each event about 50-100 local growers-mainly beneficiaries of the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project-attended. The mood was very festive, but serious
work took place. Only those who brought seeds were allowed to enter the trading
floor. Groups from each town set up tables with banners of their group's names,
packages of labeled seeds and sometimes even displays of how they grow their
food: diagrams of how to build a raised bed, how to compost, or how to build a
greenhouse. The Trafkintus do not allow any commercial activity. The spirit
behind the event is to share and exchange knowledge. After the seed trading is
complete, everyone gathers at a large table in the center of the room for a big pot
luck lunch, consisting mainly of breads baked in the mud ovens of program
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beneficiaries' homes but also tea and jam. Both events ended with spirited
renditions of the Chilean national dance, the Cueca.
More relevant to the topic of this chapter, however, is how these events began.
At both events, local officials, CET SUR representatives and program
beneficiaries made speeches, but in Quill6n, the speechmaking took on epic
proportions. The event filled the local gymnasium, local officials addressed the
crowd, often giving explicit support to the Toward Sustainable Cities Project, the
media came out and the event went on twice as long as planned. All speeches
were about the virtuous nature of the urban agriculture program: its impact of the
lives of the beneficiaries (keeping them active, generating income, improving
their diet, helping them meet and make friends with their neighbors), the way it
preserves biodiversity of local food crops, the benefits of continuing the Mapuche
tradition of trading seeds (and how they belong to everyone not multinational
corporations) and preserving the rich heritage of the Mapuche tradition. These
speeches by local officials attesting to the value and importance of the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project solidify CET SUR's local support.
The Hualqui case illustrates the point that fun, celebratory events that draw large
crowds and media attention also tend to draw the support of government officials
who also want to use these events to raise their profile among their constituents.
Planners who manage these types of projects may want to take the time out from
the nuts and bolts details of their projects to organize large celebratory events or,
even better, to leverage existing ones, as the agroecology groups were able to
do with the fairs in Hualqui. The Trafkintu, like the fairs in Hualqui, create high
profile events that local officials can capture to demonstrate their connection with
issues of importance to their constituency and raise their public profile. Elena, the
health director in Hualqui, mentioned the Trafkintu as a major event on the
mayor's calendar.132
132 Interview with Elena Salveera, Director of Health. Hualqui. June 26, 2003.
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What is most conspicuous about urban agriculture in Santiago is its absence.
Despite the talk of the ollas comunes (community kitchens) and community
gardens, the truck farmers and the amasanderfas (bread baking groups) of the
1980s, modern Santiago is strikingly bereft of these activities. An occasional
program for seniors exists here, a demonstration garden at the environmental
center there, but they are few and far between.
In contrast to Santiago, gardens are pervasive in Tome. Five thousand residents
(16 percent of the town's adult population) have been trained in agroecologic
gardening methods. Six hundred households regularly separate their organic
waste for composting. CET SUR has had a presence for over twenty years in this
small town, and the NGO is showing no sign of losing momentum. In fact, the
program is expanding. The NGO began a new program in 1999 entitled the
Toward Sustainable Citied Project to teach these methods in seven new towns.
The relative success of CET SUR's urban agriculture projects is a puzzle. How
has this program achieved this longevity and managed to grow its program
expansion while similar projects that began at the same time in Santiago leave
little mark on the mancha de aciete?133
A full explanation of this puzzle would require tracing the history of urban
agriculture in Santiago in the 1980s. As little trace is left of these activities, it is
beyond the scope of this research. Instead, this investigation explores two
features of CET SUR's work that distinguish it from similar programs and that
may point to an explanation of this puzzle-or at least lay the groundwork for
further research.
133 Literally, "oil stain," referring to the rapidity with which Santiago is expanding.
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Motivating the Monitoras
The first set of factors to explain the relative success of CET SUR's work is the
NGO's use of community-based agents, monitoras, to carry out on-the-ground
activities including teaching the basic agroecology coursework to beneficiaries,
but also recruiting new members to the program and managing some aspects of
the local budget. This alone does not distinguish the Toward Sustainable Cities
Program from other urban agriculture programs, but the way the program
maintains a high level of dedication to the job, especially in the face of a three-
year training unpaid period, indicates a shift from business as usual. Maintaining
high worker morale and motivation is a concern for any organization but
especially for those that employ workers who spend most of their time
unsupervised in remote locations.
The factors that motivate a program beneficiary to become a monitora in the
Toward Sustainable Cities Project certainly vary from individual to individual
according to personal preferences and needs. This reliance on multiple factors-
monetary as well as non-monetary-to motivate distant, frontline workers
contributes to better motivation and dedication on the part of the monitoras and
better project performance overall. Two factors such are particularly significant.
The first is the opportunity CET SUR offers the monitoras for personal
development. This development ranges from skills related to the program, such
as agroecology and leadership training, to the opportunity to complete and
receive certification for the basic education that many of these women have
missed. The latter endows the women with a transferable skill that will benefit
them no matter what they do in the future.
The second way the Toward Sustainable Cities Project maintains a high level of
worker satisfaction is by granting discretion to the monitoras. The autonomy to be
an actor in the program rather than "mere spectators in the decisions that come
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from government or from other centers of power,"134 to borrow CET SUR's own
language, is a noteworthy way to maintain a high level of dedication to the job.
The issue of worker discretion is a complicated one because it involves finding
the right balance, or tension, between central control and the autonomy of
frontline workers. CET SUR limits the discretion of the monitoras to minimize
potential costs from inefficiently low class sizes. Granting this discretion,
however, provides several valued benefits to the NGO, which may be as
important as improving worker morale, such as reducing program operating costs
by using the monitoras to carry out activities less expensively than central staff
and being able to recruit more beneficiaries to the program.
Enhancing community recognition of the work of the monitoras is a yet untapped
force that could contribute to the job satisfaction of the monitoras. Tapping into
the human desire for recognition and praise may be at odds with program goals
but could provide powerful incentives for workers to stay motivated as well as
enable healthy levels of accountability. Comments from the monitoras, such as
their preference to be called monitora rather than promotora, as well as their
pride in their work, suggest that this could be a powerful way to motivate these
frontline workers. A campaign to highlight to work of the monitoras could also
bring other benefits to CET SUR, such as increasing the recognition of their
programs and increasing the number of potential beneficiaries. Such as
campaign could potentially increase accountability for monitoras, as in the case
of Cear&, Brazil, in which a promotional campaign boosted worker morale but
also gave residents a sense that they should report any misconduct to central
off ices.135
134 From CET SUR's website, available at www.cetsur.cl
135 Ibid. (Tendler, 1997).
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Networks with Government
The second set of factors that have made the Toward Sustainable Cities Project
more successful is the myriad relationships CET SUR has developed with
government. CET SUR seeks these partnerships with government to exploit the
existing networks of government to reach more people with their program in a
new town, to secure funding for projects and to tap into the expertise of
government professionals. CET SUR has accomplished all of these objectives at
one time or another. The NGO receives funding from the Ministry of Education,
FOSIS, SERCOTEC, and occasionally from CONAMA. CET SUR works in the
schools, developing eco-clubs for youth, partners with the planning department to
develop plans, and reports on the compost plant and with the sanitation
department to manage the technical issues relating to the plant. These
partnerships have paid off: recall that it was actually the mayor of Tome that
presented CET SUR and its work to the mayors of the other towns in the region
when the NGO wanted to expand the program.
We may typically think of NGOs and government institutions as not being
particularly cooperative. In fact, comments made by government officials and
NGO leaders indicate that mutual distrust persists. For instance, the mayor and
health director of Quirihue, expressed that they dislike NGOs because they get a
disproportionate amount of funding that governments could use more
efficiently.136 The CET SUR director made it very clear that the NGO does not
bend to the will of governments and will not alter their programming just to
receive more funds.137
Despite these testy undercurrents, partnerships develop between NGOs and
government when the project merits the effort. For instance, the mayor of
Quirihue's comments did not check his enthusiasm for the idea of building a
compost plant in the town, a project for which he was willing to donate his own
136 Interview with Radl Andrade Vera, mayor, and Samuel Cerro, health director. Quirihue. June 26, 2003.
137 Interview with Rita Moya, CET SUR director. July 4, 2003.
CONCLUSIONS
land, and although CET SUR may not reinvent its programming to align with the
current objectives of government, the NGO certainly structures its activities to
take advantages of potential synergies. Two examples of ways in which CET
SUR does this is tapping into the needs of local politicians to providing concrete
benefits to constituents and creating high profile, media events to improve their
recognition or reputation in the town.
Concrete benefits can be either public or private as demonstrated by the
examples of the mud ovens for private households in San Nicolds and the
compost plants in Tom6, Hualqui and Quirihue described in chapter four. While
building a mud oven is a much simpler task than constructing and maintaining a
greenhouse, efforts at both activities build the types of partnerships with
government that CET SUR seeks.
The fairs in Hualqui and the seed exchanges in Quirihue and Quill6n illustrate
another activity that links the NGO's objectives of the Toward Sustainable Cities
Program with the need of local elected officials to maintain a high profile in the
community and connect with the interests of their constituents. These types of
events build awareness and support from local elected officials and create
enabling environments for future partnerships.
Interestingly, these interdependencies-the funding that CET SUR does receive
from government sources, such as Vida Chile, make the NGO more accountable.
The recent decision of the higher-ups in Vida Chile to cease funding the Toward
Sustainable Cities Project forces CET SUR to seek other sources of funding and
demonstrate that their work deserves this funding. For instance, CET SUR is now
attempting to use funding from the Programa Puente of Chile Solidario to pay for
some of the material costs of the program. The flexibility to secure new funding
sources when old one dry up demonstrate that the NGO is providing a valued
service.
Both of these sets of factors help account for CET SUR's longevity in Tom6 as
well as its recent expansion to the seven new towns with the Toward Sustainable
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Cities Project. The way the program motivates frontline workers and its myriad
linkages with government institutions are unusual and draw attention to
themselves as ways that the project has maintained a high level of performance
over the past two decades.
APPENDIX ONE
Food Production by Town (2002), surveys completed by local monitoras.
Hualqui in
2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
by family Square meters of land 3.6
Production (kg) 14.8
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 158 95
Bulnes, 2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
by family Square meters of land 7.9
Production (kg) 32.4
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 39 39
Tome, 2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
by family Square meters of land 4
Production (kg) 16.4
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 32 32
Ranquil, 2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
by family Square meters of land 6.2
Production (kg) 25.4
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 11 11
Quill6n, 2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
by family Square meters of land 10.6
Production (kg) 43.5
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 24 24
Quirihue, 2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
by family Square meters of land 4.9
Production (kg) 20.1
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 25 25
San Nicolas, 2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator year one
by family Square meters of land 7.1
Production (kg) 29.2
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 57 57
Coelemu, 2002 Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
by family Square meters of land 4.1
Production (kg) 16.9
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 49 49
TOTAL Production of Vegetables Indicator Year one
LEVEL ONE by family Square meters of land 6.05
Production (kg) 24.9
kg of food/square meter 4.1
Total families surveyed 395 332
TOTAL (kg) 8258
APPENDIX TWO
The national council of Vida Chile consists of:
1. Ministry of the Interior
2. General Secretary of the President
3. General Secretary of the Government
4. Ministry of Planning and Cooperation
5. Ministry of Education
6. Ministry of Work y Social Planning
7. Ministry of Health
8. Ministry of Housing, Urbanism and National Goods
9. Ministry of Agriculture
10. Ministry in Service of Women
11. The National Police (Carabineros)
12. National Council for the Control of Narcotics
13. National Commission for the Environment (CONAMA)
14. National Committee for Seniors
15. Scientific Council on Tobacco and Health
16. General Office on Sports and Recreation
17. Solidarity Fund for Social Investment (FOSIS)
18. National Institute for Youth
19. Foundation INTEGRA
20. National Council on Financial Assistance and Scholarships
21. National Council on Preschools
22. Pan-American Health Organization
23. National Department of the Consumer
24. University of Chile
